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Assisted Suicide: A Tough Pill to Swallow*
I. INTRODUCTION
My machine will take off a head in a twinkling, and the victim will feel nothing
but a slight sense of refreshing coolness on the neck We cannot make too much
haste, gentlemen, to allow the nation to enjoy this advantage.
-Joseph Ignace Guillotin, French physician to the French Assembly, 1789'
The year is 1990. Dr. Jack Kevorkian connects a diseased patient to
his "modern-day guillotine." It is not the state that is employing the de-
vice, however, rather, it was devised solely to assist the public in exer-
cising their choice to die.' With Kevorkian's assistance, Janet Adkins, an
Alzheimer's patient, was the first person to "enjoy the advantage" of an
easy and self-determined death." In October 1991, Dr. Kevorkian assisted
two more women in exercising their choice to die. Throughout this peri-
* This article is dedicated to Judith Penrose and Francine Copeland, two ladies
who have exhibited courage and tenacity in the face of illness despite their continued
suffering. Their perseverance served as an inspiration for this research.
1. DAVID S. SHRAGER & ELIzABETH FRosT, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 261 (1986).
2. See Suicide Device Inventor Charged With Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at
A21. Jack Kevorkian, a retired Michigan pathologist, first thrust himself into the
public arena when he assisted Janet Adkins, an Alzheimer's patient, in committing
suicide. See also Eric Harrison, 'Dr. Death' Arrested In 2 Women's Suicides, LA.
TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1992, at A15. Dr. Kevorkian devised an intravenous device that delivers
a lethal dose of medication into the patient's system. The patient controls the
machine's activation button and thereby actually causes his or her own death. Id.
Dubbed by the media as "Dr. Death," Kevorkian has to date "assisted" 15 people in
bringing about their own deaths. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
Kevorldan advocates establishing a nationwide network of "suicide clinics." See id.
3. E.g., Cynthia Gamey, 'Dr. Death's' Life Obsession, WASH. PoST, Dec. 20, 1990,
at Dl. Kevorkian argues that the terminally ill and chronically suicidal have a right to
ask doctors for help in planning their own deaths. Id.
4. Joyce Price, Prosecution Considered in 2 Suicides, WASH. TIMES, Oct 25, 1991,
at A4. In June 1990, Dr. Kevorkian assisted Mrs. Adkins' suicide by connecting, her to
his "suicide machine." Id. The suicide occurred in Dr. Kevorkian's Volkswagen van.
Id. Reactions to this scenario in particular, as well as the overall problem of cover-
ups and covert assisted suicides, is one reason so many individuals are urging for
passage of an official policy offering guidance. Id.
5. Harrison, supra note 2, at A15. Interestingly, none of these three women was
terminal. Janet Adkins suffered from Alzheimer's disease; Sherry Miller, 43, suffered
from multiple sclerosis; and, Marjorie Wantz, 58, suffered from intractable pelvic pain.
Id.
od, many watched in astonishment as Final Exit, a how-to suicide manu-
al written by Derek Humphry, climbed national bestseller lists." Final
Exit's success, as well as Kevorkian's emergence, is evidence of society's
desperate response to such crises as the AIDS epidemic and the lack of
national health insurance.' Many people are crying out for a certain
"quality" of life and numerous individuals are choosing to end lives that
do not meet that "quality" standard.'
The moral and legal controversy surrounding abortion fueled passion-
ate debates and protests during the 1970s and 1980s. The twenty-first
century offers a new, equally disturbing ethical conflict: the right to as-
sisted suicide. Many of the issues run parallel. Both involve the contro-
versial question of whether biological existence constitutes life. Abortion
focuses on when "life" begins and assisted suicide focuses on when life
ends." Both abortion and assisted suicide raise religious concerns and
6. DEREK HuMPHRY, FINAL Exrr THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND AS-
SISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991). See Dennis L Breo, MD-Aided Suicide Voted
Doum, 266 JAMA 2895 (1991). Humphry is the founder of the Hemlock Society, an
American organization supporting the right to die. Humphry, formerly a writer for the
London Times, euthanized his first wife with a mixture of secobarbital and codeine.
Id. Charges were filed, but Humphry was not prosecuted. Id. Years later,' Humphry's
second wife, who was recovering from breast cancer, similarly ingested a fatal com-
bination of secobarbital. Id
7. Patricia Orwen, This Book Is Like a Loaded Gun, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 13,
1991, at Fl. Final Exit has sold more than a half-million copies across North Ameri-
ca. Id
8. See BRUCE HILTON, FIRST Do No HARM 134-53 (1991). Hilton points out that
some 37 million Americans, or one in six, have no health insurance. Id at 138.
These numbers are then compared with the Canadian system of national insurance.
I& at 149-50. Interestingly, the national health crisis played a significant role in the
1992 presidential election. Shortly after he was elected, President Clinton formed a
national health task force headed by the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton. Spencer
Rich, Chamber Backs "Managed Competition." Business Group Moves Closer to
Adminstration on Policy Changes, WASH. PosT, Mar. 9, 1993, at All.
9. Michael McAteer, Euthanasia, The Moral Issue of the 90s. The Right-to-Die
Dilemma Sparks Religious Debates, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 23, 1991, at KI8. Ronald
Addns, husband of the late Janet Adkins, commented that the issue "boils down to a
matter of personal choice." Id, In this respect, the supporters of assisted-suicide are
analogous to those supporting abortion. The terms "pro-life" and "pro-choice" are as
fitting in the assisted suicide debate as they are in the abortion controversy. See also
HILTON, supra note 8, at 90. Hilton recalls the social conviction during the Karen Ann
Quinlan days: "We were certain about our deaths; in rare unanimity, we all wanted
to go fast. No lingering, no suffering." I& (emphasis added).
10. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-61 (1973) (discussing the legal
history of the debate over when life begins). Definitions of "life" will doubtlessly
follow the Roe evolution. Unfortunately, the Roe Court openly avoided accepting any
one definition based on the scientific, religious, and philosophical variations proffered.
Id. at 159. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, espoused avoidance by deter-
mining, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." Id. However,
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garner theological admonishments." Abortion is frequently a major politi-
cal issue." Candidates often win or lose a district in a certain jurisdic-
tion based upon that candidate's abortion policy.' In the aftermath of
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services," legal scholars are seriously
such a determination is critical to solidifying legal rights. As science progresses, the
definition changes. Because there is no fixed, working definition, perpetual litigation
ensues, continually seeking determinations as to what an individual's "rights" include.
Perhaps when courts and legislatures address the assisted suicide issue they will
attempt to conclusively determine when life ends. A good starting point might be A
Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 JAMA 337-40 (1968)
(requiring all reflexes to be gone, even spinal reflexes which are present in an other-
wise brain dead patient). The American Bar Association has adopted the following
definition for brain death: 'For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible
cessation of total brain function, according to the usual and customary standards of
medical practice, shall be considered dead." Ronald E. Cranford, Brain Death and the
Persistent Vegetative State, in LEGAL AND ETHIcAL ASPECTS OP TREATING CRMCALLY
AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 67 (A. Edward Doudera & J. Douglas Peters eds., 1982).
Although these limited definitions do not address the extent to which the end of life
can be imputed to the early stages of a degenerative disease, such as AIDS and
Alzheimer's, they are a good focal points to build upon.
11. SIMON LEE, LAW AND MORALS 9 (1986). In his book, Lee characterizes the
Catholic Church as the "vanguard of the 'Moral Majority.'" Id. Mr. Lee offers an ex-
cerpt from the Roman Catholic Archbishops' 1980 statement on "Abortion and the
Right to Life," which stresses that the Catholic position on aboxtion is just "one
aspect of our [the Catholic Church's] stand against all practices that degrade human
rights and dignity." Id. at 10.
12. One of the questions posed to both Justice Souter and Justice Thomas during
their Senate Judiciary Confirmation Hearings was where each stood on the abortion
question. See Ruth Marcus, Justices Souter, Thomas Follow Separate Paths, WASH.
POST, July 5, 1992, at Al.
13. For example, the candidates' views on abortion had an impact on the Novem-
ber 1992 senatorial race between Barbara Boxer and Bruce Herschensohn. George
Skelton, California Elections; Abortion, Change Cited as Key Issues for Feinstein
and Boxet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at A3.
14. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion). Webster reversed an Eighth Circuit
ruling striking down portions of Missouri's restrictive abortion statute. Id. at 499.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, attacked the Roe trimester and via-
bility elements as resulting in "a web of legal rules that have become increasingly
intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doc-
trine." Id. at 518. The Chief Justice further elaborated, "[W]e do not see why the
State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at
the point of viability." Id. at 519 (emphasis added). The case was disposed of on
narrow grounds, with the Court abstaining from a reconsideration of Roe. Id. at 525
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Although Webster did not overrule Roe, it has certainly cast a shadow of doubt
questioning the future of Roe v. Wade.6 If Roe falls, absent a legislative
determination on physician assisted suicide, the issue may soon replace
abortion as the privacy litmus test.8 As advancing medical technology
enables the prolongation of life functions, a determination must be made
as to where assisted suicide fits into our legal framework. Now that
churches, secular organizations and the American Medical Association
have taken their respective stands, the time is ripe for the government to
respond.
on Roe's longevity. The dissenters, Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, claimed
that Webster impliedly overrules Roe, stating that a woman's right to an abortion "sur-
vive[s], but [is] not secure." Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's
concurrence is particularly noteworthy, because he asserts that the Court should have
reevaluated Roe. Id. at 535 (Scalia, J. concurring).
15. 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). Roe currently remains the seminal abortion case
permitting termination of a pregnancy prior to viability. The Court found the state's
interest in preserving potential life and protecting the mother's health subservient to
the individual's right to personal autonomy. Id. For a good discussion on the future
effect of Webster, see Selina K Hewitt, Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota: Chipping Away
at Roe v. Wade in the Aftermath of Webster, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 955, 988-1003 (1991)
(addressing the impact of Justice Souter's appointment to the Court in relation to
current membership).
16. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion). The United States Supreme Court recently handed down a plurality opinion that
qualified, but did not overturn, the Court's holding in Roe. Id. at 2812 (opinion of
O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). In Casey, the plurality noted that
Roe was founded not only upon the liberty interests of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) and its progeny, but also upon
a rule ... of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity
to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treat-
ment or to bar its rejection .... [C]ases since Roe accord with Roe's view
that a State's interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any
plenary override of individual liberty claims.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810 (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990)). The plurality noted that Roe's foundations remained firm and left undisturbed
Roe's central holding that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion before fe-
tal viability. Id. at 2811-12 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter proposed that Roe's trimester framework should be
rejected in favor of a more flexible "undue burden" test. Id. at 2816-21 (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Thus, a provision of the law is invalid only if it
imposes an "undue burden" on a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at
2820 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). The Court defined "undue bur-
den" as any statute or regulation which has either the purpose of placing a "substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion" or any law, though not pur-
posefuly placing such an obstacle, that nonetheless has the same prohibitory effect. Id,
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). Once the fetus is viable, the State's
interest in preserving life allows the State to regulate and, in fact, even prohibit
abortions, except where necessary to protect the life or health of the mother. Id. at
2821 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 355-58 for a more thorough treatment of the Casey decision.
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The first part of this Comment will present the historical and theologi-
cal views towards suicide. This background material will be helpful in
understanding present-day society's response to the assisted suicide de-
bate by tracing many of the condemnations back through common law
development. The second portion of this Comment will focus on the
current status of the assisted suicide debate. Although most courts have
passed on the issue" and most legislatures do not have laws addressing
assisted suicide, 8 there is a great deal of activity shaping the legal fu-
ture of ths topic." This section emphasizes the importance of key non-
legal players in the assisted suicide debate and comments on two legisla-
tive attempts at legalizing euthanasia. Finally, this section closes with
observations of a past euthanasia program when physicians were, in es-
sence, "assisting" unwanted suicides. The third section of this Comment
attempts to present the existing statutory and case authority analogous
to assisted suicide. By focusing on the laws and cases that address the
issues analogous to the right to die, the author hopes that this Comment
will facilitate the formulation of a hypothesis as to where the courts and
legislatures are traveling, and where they might proceed if they continue
upon their current path.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION
A. An Overview of Suicide-The Historical Perspective
Suicide is defined as uself destruction" or "the deliberate termination
of one's own existence."' Historically, suicide has been labeled every-
17. After Dr. Kevorkian performed his first assisted suicide, a Michigan judge
issued a permanent injunction barring him from participating in further suicides. Tra-
cy Shryer, 'Dr. Death' Found at Scene of Ailing Woman's Suicide, L.A. TIMES, May,
16, 1992, at A25. Through January 1993, no other judicial body has addressed assisted
suicide.
18. The Michigan legislature passed a law outlawing assisted suicide, effective
March 30, 1993. Mike Martindale, Quadriplegic's Mother Thanks Dr. Kevorkian,
Gannett News Serv., Dec. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
Through January 1993, no other legislative body has addressed assisted suicides.
19. Recently, two ballot initiatives regarding physician-assisted suicide have been
defeated. In November 1991, Washington voters defeated Initiative 119. Warren King,
Both Sides Claim Victory in 119 Vote, SEArrLE TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A3. In No-
vember 1992, California voters rejected Proposition 161. Vlae Kershner, California
Voters Rejevt Nine Out of Thirteen Balot Measures, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1992, at
A15.
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTrONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1991). See also 83 C.J.S. Suicide §§ 1-2
(1953) ("Suicide is the taking of one's own life, and in its technical or legal sense
thing from a sin against God and nature' to a dignified act of hero-
ism.2Y In ancient Rome and Greece, suicide was acceptable in circum-
stances of a lengthy terminal illness or in order to avoid dishonor or
ostracism.' Despite the apparent societal acceptance in these limited
situations, there were many dissenting views. The religiously impassioned
Pythagoreans rejected suicide on all grounds regardless of motivation.'
In fact, one author credits the Pythagoreans with influencing the Hippo-
cratic Oath, the physician's code.' Plato and Aristotle are believed to
have opposed suicide.' The latter vehemently maintained that suicide
was both an act of cowardice and unjustly deprived society of one of its
productive members."
In contrast, the Stoics represented a more tolerant view.' With great
foresight, Seneca advocated a movement for individual rights and self-
determination. ' Seneca claimed, "[I]n no matter more than death should
we act according to our desire .... Why should I endure the agonies of
disease... , when I can emancipate myself from all my torments."'
This same principle often pervades discussion of the modem issue. The
Stoics offered five justifications for acceptable suicides, two of which are
pertinent to the discussion at hand: (1) chronic illness and (2) loss of
one's rational faculties."' What is most astounding is that these two justi-
requires that the self destruction be intentional and by a sane person.").
21. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 125 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 126.
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 131 (1973). Interestingly, many of the historical
principles espoused in the assisted suicide debate were similarly presented in the
abortion controversy. The historical approaches to suicide and abortion are nearly
identical. See generally id. at 130-41 (discussing the legal history of abortion).
25. ROBERT N. WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES 41 (1989). See also Roe, 410 U.S. at
131. In pertinent part, the Oath reads: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone Vf
asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman
a pessary to produce abortion." Il (emphasis added).
26. WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 42. Although both men opposed suicide per se,
Plato approved of euthanasia in cases of debilitating illnesses resulting in prolonged
suffering. Id,
27. Id. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 131 (noting that Pythagorean philosophers op-
posed the act of suicide).
28. WENNBERG, supa note 25, at 42. The Stoics are considered "more representa-
tive of the Greco-Roman period" because they exhibited greater empathy for suicides
and euthanasia than either Plato or Aristotle. Id
29. Id. at 42-43. In contrasting Seneca's view with the Christian and Jewish beliefs,
the author differentiates between "[t]he Stoic heritage [which] declares my life and
my selfhood are my own to dispose of as I see fit," and the Judeo-Christian belief
that God alone has the choice of how life and selfhood are disposed. Id. at 43.
30. Id. at 42-43. Seneca, like Socrates, exercised his avowed personal right and
took his own life. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 21, at 126.
31. WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 44. The other three justifications were: (1) if one
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fications have survived nearly two thousand years of evolving legal doc-
trine and ethical principles. Contrary to modem practice, however, Greek
and Roman physicians relied on these justifications and routinely assist-
ed terminal patients in committing suicide.'
In England, suicide was a common law felony.' Until well into the
nineteenth century, suicides resulted in the forfeiture of property and
denial of a proper burial. ' Traditionally, the bodies of feudal suicides
were buried outside cemeteries with a stake driven through their
hearts.' Modernly, neither suicide nor attempted suicide is criminal in
most jurisdictions.' However, the English Commonwealth countries
continue to provide penalties, at least theoretically, for aiding and abet-
ting suicide.'
would perform a service to others, (2) if one would thereby avoid committing an
unlawful deed, and (3) if one were impoverished. Id.
32. Timothy J. Lace, The Physician Can Play a Positive Role in Euthanasia, 262
JAMA 3075 (1989). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973). Prior to the Christian
movement, many physicians openly violated the precepts of the Hippocratic Oath, in-
cluding its mandate to refrain from giving any "deadly medicine." Once Christianity
became a widespread belief, the Oath became self-policing creed, garnering support in
the medical community. The Hippocratic Oath quickly "became the nucleus of all
medical ethics.'" Lace, supra, at 3075.
33. Cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-36. Here again, the assisted suicide issue parallels
abortion. Although abortion prior to quickening (any movement by the fetus indicating
life) was not criminal, abortion of a "quick" fetus was an offense at common law.
See generally Shari O'Brien, Facilitating Euthanatic Rational Suicide: Help Me Go Gen-
tle Into T'hat Good Night, 31 ST. Louis U. LJ. 655 (1987) (presenting a thorough
overview of the historical evolution of suicide).
34. VICTORIAN BRITAIN 770 (Sally Mitchell ed., 1988). In 1823, suicides were per-
mitted "decent burials," but only at night without Christian rites. Id. It was not until
1870 that the practice of property forfeitures was wholly abandoned. Id. Finally, in
1882, suicides were granted daylight burials. Id. at 770-71.
35. NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW 233 (1961). The last re-
corded "indecent" burial (one with a stake driven through the person) occurred in
1823 and rests at the intersections of Kings Road, Eaton Street, and Grosvenor Place
in London. Id.
36. E.g., Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864-65 (Va. 1992) (holding that because
the General Assembly has not expressly decriminalized suicide, it remains a common
law crime in Virginia). See generally 83 CJ.S. Suicide §§ 1-6 (1953 & Supp. 1992)
(discussing criminal responsibility for killing or attempting to kill oneself).
37. 2 LAws oF ENGLAND para. 443 (Lord Haisham of St. Maryleboen 4th ed. 1990).
Paragraph 443, Complicity in Suicide, states: "Although suicide is no longer an
offence in itself, any person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of
another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide is guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen
years." Id. (emphasis added).
B. Religious Treatment of Suicide-The Role of Theology
Religious views recurrently play a vital role in shaping laws and soci-
etal mores. Legislators and lobbyists have attempted to divorce reli-
gious influences in crucial legal battles, but religious undertones remain
deeply imbedded in certain modem issues. The abortion controversy is
replete with religious overtones, as evidenced by the Catholic Church's
continued involvement in "right to life" issues.' Such influence is cer-
tain to pervade the assisted suicide debate in a similar manner.'
Traditionally, Christians have denounced suicide as self-murder, relying
primarily on the Sixth Commandment's mandate: "Thou shall not Mll."
Some Christian scholars have also found support against suicide in the
139th Psalm.' Yet, even Christians on occasion have found justification
38. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). "The law, however, is con-
stantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated ... the courts will be very busy indeed." Id.
39. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
40. BURTON M. LEISER, LIBERTY, JUSTICE, AND MORALS: CONTEMPORARY VALUE CON-
FUTS 107 (2d ed. 1979). The author presents the philosophical argument against
abortion as resting on the principle that all "[h]uman life is sacred; that is, every
human being has the fundamental right to live." Id. This principle will certainly be
raised in opposition to assisted suicide, which seeks to grant every human the right
to die. The author follows up this first principle with a second that states: "Everyone
has a moral duty to respect the sanctity of human life, that is, to refrain from any
act that can reasonably be expected to cause another human being's death." Id.
(emphasis added). It is these very moral arguments that opponents of assisted suicide
will raise in attempts to prevent a legalized "right to die."
41. Exodus 20:13 (New King James); Deuteronomy 6:17 (New King James). See
also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REUGION, supra note 21, at 127; WENNBERG, supra note 25, at
41-43. The logic is described as follows: "You shall not kill a man. I am a man.
Therefore, I shall not kill myself." Id. at 56. Although most interpreters agree that the
Sixth Commandment apparently is not a direct mandate against suicide, the implica-
tion is that suicide is analogous to homicide, and therefore is similarly covered by
the Sixth Commandment's mandate against killing. Id. at 56-65. Further, the motiva-
tion behind the Sixth Commandment applies with equal force to suicide. "For to kill
oneself is to opt out of life's enterprise and to contravene the divine intention for
human existence." Id. at 65.
42. Psalms 139:13-18 (New King James). The Psalm provides:
For you have formed my inward parts; You have covered me in my mother's
womb. I will praise You, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; Marvelous
are Your works, And that my soul knows very well. My frame was not hid-
den from You When I was made in secret And skillfully wrought in the low-
est parts of the earth. Your eyes saw my substance, being yet unformed And
in Your book they all were uritten The days fashioned for me, When as yet
there were none of them How precious also are Your thoughts to me, 0
God! How great is the sum of them! If I should count them, they would be
more in number than the sand, When I awake, I am still with You.
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and penance for certain individuals who took their own lives by differen-
tiating between suicide (a sin) and martyrdom (a noble and heroic sacri-
fice).' The only New Testament depiction of suicide is Christ's betrayer,
Judas Iscariot." The allegory is simple: suicide is reserved only for the
malevolent.
0
As this biblical illustration amply portrays, vehement disapproval of
suicide was a precept of the early Christian doctrine." Saint Augustine's
adamant antisuicide position formed the Christian foundation.1
Augustine's condemnation appears in his proclamation that "suicide is
not a legitimate act even in such desperate circumstances as those of a
virgin seeking to protect her virtue."' This austere stand corresponds
with the Christian belief in unqualified preservation of life. ' Saint Au-
gustine further demonstrated this principle through his glorification of
the biblical figure Job, who tenaciously clung to life despite suffering and
Id. (emphasis added).
43. E.g., ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 35, at 250-51 (citing three general exceptions
to the Christian prohibition of suicide: (1) suicide as a result of divine inspiration, (2)
suicide as a capital punishment option under the laws of the State, and (3) altruistic
suicide, done to accomplish some good result and only in a desperate situation).
44. See Matthew 27:3-5 (New King James).
45. WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 74. Wennberg suggests a common denominator
exists in biblical suicides: each individual was "at odds with God's purposes, and
their mode of death (i.e., suicide) is inferentially implicated in the divine disfavor."
Id.
46. Id. at 53.
47. Id. (labeling Augustine's condemnation the "single most important factor in
setting the face of the Christian church firmly against acts of self-killing"). See aLso
ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 35, at 248-49. The English judiciary adopted this Augus-
tinian view, furthering the belief that for one to kill oneself is "a greater offence than
to kill another." Id. at 234-35.
48. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 21, at 127. See WENNBERG, supra note
25, at 53.
49. Blackstone is recorded as having labeled suicide as a twofold crime: one
against God, and one against the king. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 35, at 235.
And also the law of England wisely and religiously considers, that no man
hath a power to destroy life, but by commission from God, the author of it;
and, as the suicide is guilty of a double offence [sic]; one spiritual, in invad-
ing the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presences
uncalled for, the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest in the
preservation of all his subjects; the law has therefore ranked this among the
highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony committed on one's
self.
ld.
hardship.' This view remains instilled in the minds of devout Christians
who believe the body is merely a temple for God and accept suffering as
part of the divine plan.6
Judaism parallels Christianity in its reverence of human life.' The
Jews similarly distinguish between straight suicide and acts of martyr-
dom.' The Hebrew scriptures present several examples of technical sui-
cide," yet all occasions are condoned as martyrdom.' Though Judaism
denounces suicide, those who commit suicide are permitted traditional
burial rites. Victorian England lacked this cultural forgiveness as suicides
were denied a respectful burial.'
Muslims, the followers of Islam, fall directly in line with their Christian
and Jewish counterparts. Muslims condemn suicide, believing suicides
50. Job 7:1-4 (New King James).
Is there not a time of hard service for man on earth? Are not his days also
like the days of a hired man? Like a servant who earnestly desires the
shade, And like a hired man who eagerly looks for his wages. So I have
been allotted months of futility And wearisome nights have been appointed
to me. When I lie down, I say, 'When shall I arise, And the night be end-
ed?' For I have had my fill of tossing till dawn.
Id. (emphasis added). See also, WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 53.
61. WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 82-88.
52. Amnon Carmi, Live Like a King, Die Like a King, in EUTHANASIA 4 (Amnon
Carrei ed., 1984). Referring to Genesis 9:6, the author observes that "It]he shedding of
blood is the primeval sin, and throughout the centuries ranks in Jewish law as the
gravest and most reprehensible of all offenses." Id. at 4. An illustration follows: "If a
Gentile said to a Jew: 'Kill or be killed,' let the Jew prefer death and not commit
that sin." Id. Further, the Jewish faith similarly accepts that man is supposed to
suffer as a consequence of his mortal nature. "[P]ain [and suffering are) a direct
consequence of original sin, which should be stoically endured." Id. at 22. See also
Rabbi Levi Meier, Code and No-Code: A Psychological Analysis and the Viewpoint of
Jewish Law, in LEGAL AND ETHIcAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRMCALLY AND TERMINALLY
ILL PATIENTS 94 (A. Edward Doudera & J. Douglas Peters eds., 1982). "Within Judaic
tradition, life has infinite value-even a diminished life. The value of a human life is
not based upon its potential usefulness to others or upon one's own well-being. It is
an absolute value, even when life is accompanied by pain, suffering and mental
anguish." I.
53. Carrl, supra note 52, at 8. Several justifications exist not only enabling but
demanding that a Jewish person commit suicide. They are as follows: idolatry, adul-
tery, or murder. Id. The Jewish faith mandates that in each of these instances, the
person "must kill himself or let himself be killed rather than commit any of these
crimes." Id.
54. For Black's Law Dictionary technical definition of suicide, see supra note 20.
55. Carmi, supra note 53, at 8-9 (listing Saul and his armorbearor, Samson,
Ahitophel, Jonah, the 40 Jews at Yodfat, and the 960 Jewish warriors at Mezadah).
The two latter instances, at Yodfat and Mezdah, are examples of martyrdom wherein
the groups chose suicide rather than capture and religious conversion. 1d.
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20: 689, 1993] Physician-Assisted Suicide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
are denied Paradise and sentenced to Hell."7 Modem-day Muslims re-
main vehemently opposed to suicide, including any type of euthanasia."
While Jews and Muslims have not modified their views, many modern-
day Christians are retreating from their previous unyielding stand.'
Catholics, however, remain firm in their opposition to both suicide and
assisted suicide.' They demonstrated their commitment to "life" by con-
tributing over $717,000, or nearly half of all funds raised to defeat Wash-
ington state's Initiative 119.' This figure seems slight compared to the
over $2.8 Imillion raised by the Catholic community in California to defeat
similar legislation.' Other denominations have seen virtue in these at-
tempts to permit a limited degree of self-determination.' The Method-
ists, Lutherans, and Episcopalians all supported Washington's proposal."
These sects emphasized scriptural passages which mandate "compassion,
57. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra note 21, at 128.
58. Russell Chandler, Religion Coqfronts Euthanasia, LA. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1991, at
Al.
59. Id.
60. Id. at A25. This view is consistent with the Catholic view that life should be
protected at conception. The Catholic Church has continuously sponsored many ral-
lies, walks, and liturgical masses to demonstrate its concern for life. Id.
In apparent contrast, however, Pope Pius XII accepted the discontinuance of life-
sustaining machines and medications as a matter of individual choice. He dismissed
such action as not amounting to suicide. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(NJ.), cert. denied sub non. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Bishop
Casey supported the Quinlan family's decision, stating that "[t]o request the discon-
tinuance of this treatment is, according to the teachings of the Catholic Church, a
morally correct decision." Id. at 659. The distinction made by the Catholic Church is
between ordinary and extraordinary treatment. Catholic patients are not required to
endure extraordinary treatment, such as cardiorespiratory "supportive measures" to
sustain continuation of body functions. Id. at 659.
61. Chandler, supra note 58, at A25. See generally Breo, supra note 6.
62. Proposition 161 would have provided for physician-assisted suicide in Califor-
nia. Doctor-Assisted Suicide Measure Loses in California, Reuters, Nov. 4, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omn file. Supporters of Proposition 161 raised a
comparatively meager $215,000. Many sources credit the Catholic Church and its
financial support for the last minute defeat of Proposition 161, which was reportedly
favored in the polls. See Paul Jacobs, Proposition 161; Outcome of Death Measure
May Rest on I1th Hour Ads, LA. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at A3.
63. Jacobs, supra note 62, at A3. See also Legal Suicide Measure in California
Headed fr Defeat, Reuters, Nov. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni
file. A United Church of Christ minister reportedly took a leave of absence from his
parish in order to support the Proposition 161 campaign.
64. See Chandler, supra note 58, at A25.
human dignity and worth.'
C. Cultural Views
1. A Study of Life on the Homefront
A recent Los Angeles Times article succinctly stated the assisted sui-
cide dilemma: "It is immoral and dangerous to terminate a life .... [I]t's
equally immoral and dangerous to extend the dying process. Where you
draw the line is where the gray comes in."' The varied treatment ac-
corded assisted suicide throughout the world is evidence of this "gray"
area. Even in the United States, individual states' responses to the as-
sisted suicide question are spread out across the spectrum. Twenty-seven
states maintain statutes criminalizing aiding and abetting suicide.' With
the exception of Michigan, where the topic is currently embroiled in
65. iL
66. Id,
67. See infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
68. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (1962) (suggesting that assisted suicide be
treated as a second degree felony); ArEz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A) (1985) (pe-
nalizing assisted suicide as manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 410 (West 1970) (mak-
ing "aiding and abetting" suicide a unique crime, punishable as a felony); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-56(a) (West 1985) (intentionally causing or aiding the suicide of
another is manslaughter); DEL CODE ANN. tit 11 § 645 (1975) (establishing aiding and
abetting suicide as a separate crime); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.02 (West 1976) (assisting
"self-murder" amounts to committing manslaughter); RAw. REv. STAT. § 707-702(b)
(1976) (punishing anyone who "intentionally causes another person to commit sui-
cide"); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-1-2 (Bums 1985) (intentionally causing another person
to commit suicide is a class B felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1981) ("intentional-
ly advising, encouraging, or assisting another in the taldng of his own life" is a
felony); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1989) (imposing up to 15 years' imprison-
ment or $30,000 fine for aiding suicide and up to seven years' imprisonment or
$14,000 fine for aiding attempted suicide); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97.3-49 (1972) (aiding
suicide is a felony); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1991) ("aiding or soliciting suicide"
is a felony carrying a penalty of up to 10 years in prison or a fine of $50,000); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989) ("causing or aiding suicide" amounts to criminal homicide
if achieved with force, duress, or deception; otherwise, it constitutes a separate of-
fense); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1982) (aiding suicide is an independent
crime); OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813-818 (West 1983) (prohibits willfully aiding
suicide in any manner, i.e. advising, encouraging, abetting, assisting; also, prohibits
fuulihing a person with a "deadly weapon or poisonous drug" for the purpose of
committing suicide); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125(b) (1989) (intentionally causing or
aiding another person to commit suicide is manslaughter); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 18 §
2505(a) (Purdon 1983) (aiding or soliciting suicide is a second degree felony); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1988) (aiding and abetting suicide amounts to a
felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1989) (aiding suicide is a misde-
meanor, unless death occurs, making the crime a felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.36.060 (1988) (felony to promote a suicide attempt); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.12
(West 1982) (felony to assist a suicide).
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controversy," each remaining state presumably has some common law
or case authority outlawing assisted suicide.'m
2. The Voices from Abroad
A significant portion of America's common law ancestry stems from
England. The American colonists brought with them various forms of
government, many of which were modeled after the English system.
Thus, American positions concerning suicide closely parallel its treat-
ment, historically and currently, in England. Suicide is not a criminal
offense in England.' Aiding and abetting suicide is a criminal offense,
however, carrying a punishment of up to fourteen years'imprisonment.'
Canada, another Commonwealth country, has likewise decriminalized
suicide and prohibits only aiding and abetting suicide.' In 1982, there
were 3529 suicides reported in Canada, making suicide one of the top ten
causes of death in Canada and the second among people under thirty-
five.7
4
In 1992, Canadians were surprised when a Quebec court permitted a
twenty-five-year-old paralytic, Nancy B., to pull the plug on her life-sus-
taining respirator." Legal commentators saw this decision as a major
stepping stone both in establishing a right to die and accepting assisted
suicide.m The non-terminal patient suffered from Guillain-Barre syn-
drome, a neurological disorder. She was totally dependent on a ventilator
to maintain her breathing functions.' The court's decision was especial-
69. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. Dr. Jack Kevorkian has again been
indicted for murder as a result of "assisting" two suicides. See Harrison, supra note
2, at A15. Michigan must, therefore, determine whether assisting suicide is a criminal
offense in their particular jurisdiction.
70. Juliana Reno, A Little Help From My Friends: The Legal Status of Assisted
Suicide, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1151, 1156 (1992). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5
(1962) (prohibiting both purposefully causing another's death, even when requested,
and prohibiting "aiding or soliciting" another's suicide).
71. E.g., LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 37, at para 443.
72. Id. Based on the Suicide Act of 1961, any person aiding, counseling or procur-
ing the suicide of another may be tried under an indictment of murder or manslaugh-
ter. ld.
73. TIE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1770 (James H. Marsh ed., 1985).
74. Id. sit 1771.
75. Paralyzed Canadian Woman Wins Court Ruling on Right to Die, WASH. POST,
Jan. 7, 1992, at A9.
76. Id.
77. Id.
ly significant in that the patient was aware, could speak, and faced sever-
al more years of existence at the time she requested deactivation of her
respirator.' Both euthanasia and assisted suicide are illegal under Cana-
dian federal law.' Nancy B.'s request was secured, however, under the
Quebec Civil Code, which provides for the right to refuse medical treat-
ment. Following the defeat of Proposition 161 in California, Canadians
once again took an active interest in euthanasia. Another Canadian, Sue
Rodriquez, currently seeks the right of assisted suicide from the Canadi-
an courts." Ms. Rodriquez suffers from Lou Gerhig's disease. She in-
dicated that, had the California legislation passed, she would have made
the trip to California to receive assistance in ending her life.' Currently,
however, her only hope lies in the Canadian judicial system.'
In contrast to the Commonwealth views, Japanese society openly con-
dones suicide as an accepted way to "save face," or preserve one's digni-
ty." The Japanese kamikaze pilots of World War II chose to crash their
planes voluntarily, rather than submit to defeat or capture." likewise,
the renowned suicide cliffs in Okinawa saw the demise of several thou-
sand Japanese soldiers who chose to jump instead of submitting to cap-
ture by the enemy. Suicide is currently the seventh leading cause of
death in Japan.' Seventeen out of every 100,000 Japanese take. their
own lives.'7 This societal view is perhaps the most conducive to accept-
ing a right of assisted suicide. However, the most chilling example of
societal acceptance of assisted suicide was the "euthanasia program" of
78. Id, Nancy B.'s doctors diagnosed her as having irreversible neurological dam-
age. They projected she would be dependent on a respirator for the rest of her life.
Il Nancy echoed the feeling of many other similarly situated petitioners, both in
Canada and the United States: "I do not want to live on this machine." Id, (emphasis
added). Her plea is a poignant illustration of medical "progress." Nancy breathes only
because science has provided doctors with a machine that takes over where her
body has permanently shut down.
79. Id.
80. Id, These issues-right to die, euthanasia, and assisted suicide-are currently
under examination in the Canadian Parliament. Id. In particular, a House of Com-
mons committee is considering a bill that would grant physician immunity in cases
like Nancy B.'s, in which removal of life-sustaining equipment or administration of
large doses of pain medications hastens a patient's death. Il
81. Frank Jones, Euthanasia Boosters Aim To Kill Our Compassion, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 9, 1992, at DI.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 34 (University of Chicago ed., 1977). Under
Japan's constitutional system, human rights are considered to be "eternal and inviola-
ble." Id. at 52.
85. Id.
86. See generaUy BRITANNIcA BOOK OF THE YEAR (University of Chicago ed., 1991).
87. Id.
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Nazi Germany.
D. A Case Study-The Nazi "Euthanasia Program"
Suicide is currently the fifth leading cause of death in Germany, with
fifteen of 100,000 people taking their own lives.' Euthanasia is a Ger-
man word that means "easy or gentle death."' Hitler's Nazi Germany re-
minds individuals of what can happen when killing and "quality of life"
become an accepted part of societal decisions.' The National Socialists
predicated much of their anti-Semitic activity during World War II
through "euthanasia programs."' Hitler sought a pure Volk (people), and
88. BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR, sutpra note 86, at 603.
89. E. McClatchey, Same Aspects of Euthanasia from the Point of View of a
Family Doctor, in EuTHANASIA 103 (Amnon Carmi ed., 1984). See also ST. JOHN-
STEVAS, supra note 35, at 262 (noting the Greek translation is "happy death").
90. VICTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING 152 (1984). Franki, himself a
prisoner in Nazi concentration camps, presents the ironic digression that arises from
a strictly utilitarian viewpoint towards life:
[T]oday's society is characterized by achievement orientation, and consequent-
ly it adores people who are successful and happy and, in particular, it adores
the young. It virtually ignores the value of all those who are otherwise, and
in so doing blurs the decisive difference between being valuable in the sense
of dignity and. being valuable in the sense of usefulness. If one is not cog-
nizant of this difference and holds that an individual's value stems only from
his present usefulness, then, believe me, one owes it to personal inconsisten-
cy not to plead for euthanasia along the lines of Hitlers program, that is to
say, "mercy" killing of all those who have lost their social usefulness, be it
because of old age, incurable illness, mental deterioration, or whatever handi-
cap they may suffer.
Id.
91. WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 215-16. Wennberg describes the evolution of
Germany's program:
The Nazi Euthanasia program served a preparatory function for the Nazis'
subsequent attempt to exterminate the entire Jewish population of Europe. In-
deed, the administrative center for the euthanasia program subsequently as-
sumed the task of overseeing the mass murder of the Jews. Procedures and
techniques that had been employed during the euthanasia phase-procedures
for gassing those assessed as having "lives unworthy of living" and disposing
of the bodies-were continued when Jews were substituted for the mentally
and physically handicapped. In addition, there was a carryover of personnel.
And, significantly, as Gitta Sereny stresses, "The work at the euthanasia insti-
tutes... did 'inure' them to feeling and thus prepare them for the next
phase."
Id, at 216 (footnote omitted).
his euthanasia programs fit neatly within this Nazi ideology. Social Dar-
winism permitted disposing of those lives deemed "unworthy of living."'
The killing of mental and physical incompetents preceded the killing of
Jews, serving as a springboard for Hitler's full-scale Holocaust.'
One author explains Hitler's madness as serving two purposes: (1)
purifying the Volk, and (2) freeing national resources otherwise squan-
dered on the mental and physical dependents of the State."'
Handicapped children, deemed "unworthy of life" by physicians, were the
first victims of Hitler's crusade.' Later, Operation T4 expanded the so-
called "euthanasia program" to include adult incompetents, who were
similarly chosen by physicians." The first concentration camp victims
were not-Jews, but mental incompetents executed due to their inability
to contribute to the commune.' Once public outrage halted the gassing
92. 1L at 218. Wennberg cites the Nazi emphasis on a pure Volk as the primary
motivation behind the euthanasia program. "The Volk was pure to the degree that it
was free of any non-Aryan admixture and free of mentally and physically defective
'elements', Aryan or otherwise." Id.
93. Id. Unlike Dr. Kevoridan's assisted suicides, the Nazi Euthanasia program was
Involuntarily inflicted upon these individuals. "In neither area and in none of the
[Nazi Euthanasia] cases was death administered because of a sick or dying person's
intolerable suffering or because of a patient's own feelings about the usefulness of
his life. In no case did the patient ask for death." Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Id. "We should be clear that the Nazi euthanasia program was not motivated
by considerations of mercy." Id Instead, the goal was one of complete German
domination throughout the world. Hitler proposed that this goal could only be at-
tained if Germany were rid of impure Volk. Excerpts from a German mathematics
textbook vividly illustrate the point-
Question No. 95. If the building of a lunatic asylum costs six million marks
and it costs 15,000 marks to build each dwelling on a housing estate, how
many of the latter could be built for the price of one asylum?
Question No. 97. Daily maintenance of an insane person costs 4 marks, of a
cripple 5.5 marks and of a criminal 3.5 marks. In how many cases does an
official earn daily only about 4 marks, a factory employee barely 3.5 marks
and an unskilled labourer less than 2 as the head of a family? (a) Illustrate
these figures graphically. According to calculations there are some 300,000 in-
sane persons, epileptics, etc., in Germany under treatment in institutions. (b)
Give the total yearly cost of such persons at the rate of 4 marks p.d. [per
day]. (c) How many State marriage loans of 1,000 marks not repayable,
would be issued annually from the amount now spent on insane, etc.?
Id. at 217-218 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 214-15.
96. Id. at 217-18. Over 5000 children were euthanized in this manner, without pa-
rental consent. Id. at 215. The death notices sent to the parents of these children
listed "tumor of the brain," or some other disease, as the cause of death. Id, The
bodies were quickly cremated, allegedly due to the threat of "an epidemic" at the
Institution. Id. The total number killed under this program, including adults, rose to be-
tween 50,000 and 60,000 by the middle of 1941. Id, at 214.
97. Id.
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of disabled patients, Hitler continued his euthanasia program with tab-
lets, iejections, or withholding of nourishment in the hospitals on these
same disabled patients."
The modem German Grundgesetz,' however, places human life as the
supreme value in society."° Consistent with that view, assisted suicide
is a criminal offense."' German law imposes an affirmative burden on
spouses, parents, and doctors to protect life."in However, similar to
American doctors, German physicians are not precluded from prescribing
or administering lethal doses of pain medication in an attempt to ease a
patient's suffering.' These images remain firmly imbedded in the dark
pages of history. The Nazi view towards euthanasia, based partly on eco-
nomic efficiency, allowed a digression to the Holocaust. Not surprisingly,
many modem German citizens denounce the idea of assisted suicide.
This horrible example should serve as a caution to modem legislators
facing today's issue that any assisted suicide plan requires co-existing
security measures.'"
While the Nazi program differs dramatically from the current American
proposals because no state action is involved in the latter, the analogy
may still be important in certain cases. For instance, what will happen in
98. 1l at 214-15. Hitler's program remained active against the handicapped until
the end of the war, ernoying a "quasi-legal status" authorized by the Third Reich. Id.
This scenario demonstrates the extreme of what could happen if assisted suicide was
allowed without proper restraints.
99. E. Deutsch, Euthanasia: A German View, in EuHANASIA 91 (Amnon Cami
ed., 1984). The Grundgesetz is the German constitution.
100. Id. "Life, being the supreme value in our society, cannot be classified into
categories such as 'useful' or 'useless', and must be sustained as long as possible if
this is desiredby the patient." Id at 93. But qf. WENNBERG, supra note 25, at 217-18
(discussing Nazi Germany math textbook questions that illustrate how money spent
on the insane or disabled could be better spent elsewhere).
101. E. Deutsch, supra note 99, at 91. Assisted suicide is prohibited even if "explic-
it[ly] requested [by] the victim." Id
102. Id,
103. 1L at 92. See also James Vorenberg, Washington State's Euthanasia Refer-
endum, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1991, at A25 (briefly describing the American practice).
104. One source has expressed this very caution. See Arthur Hoppe, A Matter of
Life and Death, S.F. CHRON. Oct. 25, 1992, at 1:
[I]f we allow society to control our deaths for its benefit, the 'Orwellian day
is forseeable when we practice euthanasia on the old, the handicapped and,
yes, the terminally ill-not by request, but by fiat. Surely, ridding ourselves of
these useless consumers of health care dollars would result in a far healthier
citizenry and a more vigorous economy.
Ild.
military hospitals under modem proposals? If military doctors are
deemed state actors, then we may be faced with the same type of state
euthanasia that Hitler so heinously abused, even if it is not taken to the
same extreme. Further, if a national health insurance plan is passed,"0
then the state will necessarily be involved. Every doctor, as an extension
of the state, will be maling decisions for the state rather than in their
individual capacity. Although these caveats may seem premature, no one
believed Hitler was destroying an entire race of people precisely because
no one dared think the unthinkable. The Netherlands, however, in be-
coming the first country to condone, though not legalize, euthanasia, has
not encountered the nightmarish consequences of the Nazis' Euthanasia
Program.
Ill. TAKING CHANCES-INNOVATORS
A. A Tolerance of Assisted Suicide-The Dutch Stand'o'
The Dutch were the first to socially accept physician assisted suicide,
although the practice remains technically illegal.'"7 The Netherlands Pe-
nal Code states that anyone "[w]ho takes another person's life even at
his explicit and serious request, will be punished by imprisonment of at
most 12 years."' ' This section applies equally to physicians and non-
physicians, although the courts seemingly tolerate a physician's participa-
tion in an assisted suicide provided certain conditions are met. The fac-
tors necessary to absolve a physician are as follows: (1) the patient must
voluntarily consent; (2) the patient's suffering must be excruciating; (3)
all possible treatment alternatives must have been attempted and ex-
hausted; (4) a second physician must agree with the treating physician's
findings; and (5) the patient's treating physician must perform the assist-
105. Dana Priest, Medical Price Caps Drfted for Clinton Adviser Has 3 Options
for Short Term, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1993, at Al. As President Clinton's national
health task force suggests, major alterations in health care are certainly forthcoming.
Although this Comment focuses on national price controls rather than nationalized
insurance, the direction is towards securing insurance coverage for every American.
See Robert Pear, White House Expected to Back Oregon's Health-Care Rationing, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1993, at Al (detailing Oregon's plan to expand Medicaid coverage by
eliminating coverage for certain enumerated treatments).
106. At the time this article went to press, the Dutch legislature had proposed a
statute that will further liberalize their laws on assisted suicide and give even greater
protection to physicians. The law is scheduled to take effect in early 1994. See, e.g.,
Tamara Jones, Netherlands Law Sets Guidelines for Euthanasia, LA. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1993, at Al.
107. M.A-M. de Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316
(1989).
108. Id. at 3317 (citing Netherlands Penal Code § 293) (emphasis added).
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ed suicide."'° The fulfillment of each of these requirements must be writ-
ten and recorded."°
Any failure to follow these requirements could lead to prosecution.
Thus, the figures recorded regarding physician assisted suicide are inac-
curate at best."' Still, public support exceeds seventy percent, even in
assisted suicides involving children."' Figures vary regarding the actual
number of physician-assisted suicides, but the estimates fall between
2000 and 10,000 cases annually.'" One study suggests that a similar pro-
gram in the United States would result in between 33,000 and 167,000
deaths annually."'
The first recorded conviction under Section 293 of the Dutch Penal
Code occurred in 1973, although the convicted doctor received rather
lenient treatment: a one-week suspended jail sentence followed by a one-
year probationary period."' In 1982, the Dutch established a State Com-
mission on Euthanasia to respond to the debate and make recommen-
dations on euthanasia legislation."" Thirteen of the fifteen commission
members agreed that doctors meeting the accepted prerequisites should
not be prosecuted under the existing statute."
7
The fall of the coalition government in 1989 partially explains why no
legislation was ever passed."8 However, prior to its demise, two major
legislative proposals were advanced and discussed in Parliament."' The
109. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Ethics, 265 JAMA 3118 (1991).
110. Id.
111. De Wachter, supra note 107, at 3317.
112. Pellegrino, supra note 109, at 3118.
113. Id. See also Paul Jacobs, California Elections; Proposition 161; Initiative
Fuels Debate Over Morality of Euthanasia, LA. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at A20. Mr.
Jacobs reports that a court-sponsored study of the Netherlands' program credited a
mere 396 of the country's deaths to assisted suicides Id. This figure is far lower than
initial estimates. Id.
114. H.M. Ducharme et al., Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 263 JAMA
1197 (1990).
115. De Wachter, supra note 107, at 3317. The defendant, a physician, injected his
mother with a lethal dose of morphine at her request.
116. De Wachter, supra note 107, at 3318.
117. Id. The criteria used to judge whether a physician acted according to accepted
practices are as follows: "(1) [the assisted suicide must be] carried out by a physi-
cian; (2) it must be done within a setting of careful practice, which requires that the
patient be informed about the seriousness of his or her state ... ; and (3) the pa-
tient is in an untenable situation without prospect for improvement" Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
Kohnstanm Bill would have legalized euthanasia outright, while the oth-
er bill would have continued to crininalize euthanasia with certain ex-
emptions for physicians.' The failure of these measures left other
countries with the opportunity to lead the way in legalizing euthanasia.
The United States was the first country to respond.
B. Initiative 119-Washington State Responds to the Cries for Guid-
ance
On November 5, 1991, Washington State voters defeated an initiative
that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide. Initiative 119 provid-
ed terminally ill patients a right to obtain physician assistance in com-
mitting suicide. 2' Under the proposed initiative, if two doctors could
120. I& No debate or vote occurred for either of these proposals. Id. A third pro-
posal, however, has been circulated throughout Amsterdam. Id. Developed by the
health care services director, the government inspector of health, and the district
attorney, the policy mandates the following standards:
1. Since active euthanasia does not allow the physician to write a death cer-
tificate mentioning natural causes, the coroner must be contacted as soon as
the patient dies. The coroner examines the reasons invoked for euthanasia, as
well as whether its administration was done with professional care.
2. The coroner reports directly to the district attorney.
3. The police discreetly investigate the situation of the deceased, ask the phy-
sician about the conditions under which euthanasia was administered, and
report to the district attorney. Unless something unusual is discovered, the
family will not be questioned
4. The district attorney decides whether an autopsy will take place before
burial or cremation.
5. The district attorney consults with the public health inspector.
6. The district attorney submits a final report to the appropriate attorney gen-
eral.
7. All (five) attorneys general and the secretary general of the Ministry of
Justice discuss each case and decide to prosecute or dismiss the case.
I&
The Amsterdam policy's success cannot truly be measured because it is still un-
certain how many physicians have complied with the proposed immunity format intro-
duced in October 1987. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. The Royal
Dutch Medical Association has expressed fear that without solid legal guidance, physi-
cians will be held to differing levels of care depending on the particular court. De
Wachter, supra note 107, at 3318. It is suggested that "[olnly a case of euthanasia test-
ed by the [Dutch] Supreme Court could guarantee such legal certitude." Id
121. Warren King, Decisive Loss for 'Aid in Dying,' SEArLE TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1991, at
Dl. Actually, two prior attempts at legalizing euthanasia occurred in the United
States ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 35, at 266. The first state to introduce a euthana-
sia bill for consideration was Nebraska in 1938. Id,. This bill was modeled after a
similar English bill, which was defeated in the House of Lords. Id, New York also
considered and similarly rejected a euthanasia bill in 1938, and again in 1941. ld. The
1936 English Bill is remarkably similar to Initiative 119, requiring
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certify that the patient would die within six months and two disinterest-
ed witnesses could certify that the patient's choice was voluntary, then
the physician could legally perform an assisted suicide."i nitiative 119
failed, fifty-four to forty-six percent."-°Much information can be
gathered from this mere eight-point margin. First, there is great support
for assisted suicide legislation.I" Further evidence of this trend is the
prominence of "right to die" groups, such as the Hemlock Society and
the newly formed coalition, Choice in Dying, Inc.Iu Second, even
though there is a vocal segment of the population that supports "patient
choice" in dying, many citizens remain skeptical of the desirability of full-
fledged legalization.'
that the patient . . . be twenty-one years old, of sound mind, and suffering
from a fatal and incurable disease, accompanied by severe pain. A formal ap-
plication is to be signed by the patient in the presence of two witnesses and
submitted to the 'Euthanasia Referee', an official appointed by the Minister of
Health, together with two medical certificates, one from the attendant doctor
and the other from a specially qualified practitioner. The referee is to con-
duct a personal interview of the patient and establish that he fully under-
stands what he is doing. Euthanasia is to be administered by a licensed prac-
titioner in the presence of an official witness, such as a minister... or
justice of the peace.
Id. at 267.
122. King, .rupra note 121, at DI. Initiative 119 also tried to clarify sections of the
state's Natural Death Act, proclaiming nasogastric and water tubes to be "life sup-
ports," removable at the patient's request. Id.
123. Richard Knox, Washington State Voters Reject a Proposal to Legalize Euthana-
sia, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1991, at 15. This result is inconsistent with the 6096 sup-
port ratio the Initiative received in a survey conducted only a few weeks earlier. Id.
Of further importance is the effect of this decision on a nationwide scale. Washington
state is renowned for its reverence of individual rights. Deeann Glasmer, Right to
Die: California May Be Next Test For Legalized Suicide, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 1991,
at 3A. Washington was touted as "one of the few spots where such a measure had a
chance." Id.
124. Knox, supra note 123, at 15. See Glasmer, supra note 123, at 3A; National
Hemlock Society Issues Statement On Defeat Of Initiative 119 [hereinafter Hemlock
Society Statement], PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, PR
Newswire file. Upon realizing the failed Initiative received over 600,000 votes, Derek
Humphry, national executive director of the Hemlock Society, optimistically stated
that "[t]he great debate of the 1990s about the right to choose to die will be settled
in California next year with a much more carefully framed law." Id.
125. Letter from Evan R. Collins, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Choice in
Dying, Inc. (Oct. 1991) (on file with the Pepperdine Law Review). Two previously
separate organizations, the Society for the Right to Die and Concern For Dying, re-
cently merged, boasting a combined national membership of nearly 200,000 with more
than 300,000 annual contributors.
126. See Joyce Price, Suicide Initiative Vote Shows Changing Mood, WASH. TImES,
Critics cited several reasons for Initiative 119's failure. Foremost
among them was the lack of adequate safeguards. Derek Humphry, Presi-
dent and Founder of the Hemlock Society," blamed local groups for
failing to "build into the reform sufficient protections against abuse.""
Nazi Germany demonstrated the worst-case scenario of inadequate safe-
guards." What began as a physician-assisted program that euthanized
children deemed "unworthy of living" degenerated into the horrifying,
systematic execution of several thousand unwilling victims."3
Another explanation for Initiative 119's failure was the participatory
role given to the medical profession.' The image of doctors interwoven
with the death process, especially suicide, directly contradicts the medi-
cal profession's principles of healing." A third reason for Initiative
119's failure may be due in part to the controversy surrounding Dr. Jack
Kevorkian.' Two weeks prior to the Washington vote, Dr. Kevorkian
euthanized two non-terminal patients. His conduct and criteria in deter-
mining "eligible' patients fell outside the legal parameters of Initiative
119 and would not be permitted in Washington even had the measure
passed.' Response to Dr. Kevorkian's maverick euthanasia crusade fu-
els critics who say that legalizing physician-assisted suicide would give
doctors leverage over patients that would be difficult to control.'
A final reason voters may have rejected Initiative 119 was the absence
of any residency requirement." One critic feared that Washington
might become a place where doctors such as Kevorkian would "set up
convenient branch offices in shopping malls."3 Another commentator
charged that lack of a residency requirement could result in "desperate
people flocking to Washington to end their lives," resulting in
Nov. 7, 1991, at A3. "The political mood now is swinging away from sympathy for
people [who are terminally ill and want to die] to a fear that doctors will become
executioners." Id. Burke Balch, an opponent of Initiative 119, stated that "the defeat
'indicates the public is beginning to realize the grave dangers of starting down the
path of dealing with problems by getting rid of the people to whom problems hap-
pen.'" Id.
127. See Breo, supra note 6, at 2895.
128. See Hemlock Society Statement, supra note 124.
129. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Part IV.B. for a response from both the American Medical Associa-
tion and the Nurses Association.
132. See supra note 25 (referring to the Hippocratic Oath).
133. See supra notes 2-5; see also infra notes 189-212 and accompanying text
(discussing Dr. Jack Kevorkian and his effect on the assisted suicide debate).
134. Knox, supra note 123, at 15.
135. ld.
136. Erik Lacitis, Bite The Ballot: Our Voters' Guide Gives You the Worst-Case Sce-
narios, SEAnTLE TimEs, Nov. 5, 1991, at Fl.
137. Id.
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Washington's becoming a kind of killing resort.'
Despite its shortcomings, Initiative 119 garnered a great deal of sup-
port and national attention for other states to follow. California quickly
responded, becoming the next site for a similar battle." As evidence of
the push for some place of refuge legalizing assisted suicide, California
voters solicited the necessary 385,000 signatures to put a similar statute
on their ballot in November 1992.'
C. Proposition 161-The Question Is Posed to California Voters
Young lawyers are often taught that a change in jurisdiction can mean
the difference between winning or losing a case. It is no secret that some
areas are more receptive to innovations in the law than other, more con-
servative communities. Two attorneys, who formed Californians Against
Human Suffering and authored the "Death with Dignity Act," hoped to
exploit California's reputation as a leader in legal innovation.' What
the group did not anticipate, however, was the strong opposition from
the California Medical Association, the California Nurses Assocation,
AIDS Care Los Angeles," and the Catholic Church.' While support-
138. Knox, supra note 123, at 15.
139. In November 1992, California voters defeated Proposition 161 54% to 4696. Dana
Parsons, How Far Should We Open the Door When Death Knocks, LA. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1993, at 13. Proposition 161 would have allowed physicians to give lethal ijec-
tions to patients who had no more than six months to live, had signed a request for
the killing in advance, and had requested more than once to be allowed to die. Peter
Steinfels, Help for the Helping Hands in Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, § 4, at 1.
140. Knox, brupra note 123, at 15. See also Hemlock Society Statement, supra note
124. The California initiative offered three additional safeguards not present in Initia-
tive 119: (1) there is a waiting period; (2) the family must be informed that the
patient desires euthanasia, although the family will be unable to veto the request; and
(3) all assisted suicide deaths must be reported to the state health agency. Id. A
fourth possible inclusion will be a requirement that the patient undergo a psycho-
logical examination in cases where competency is questioned. Id.
141. John Yang, Californians Will Decide Tuesday if Physicians Can Help Patients
Die, WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1992, at A14. The purported impetus for this follow-up
legislation after the Washington defeat was the long illness of Darlena Risley eight
years earlier. Co-author Robert L Risely, a California attorney, stated he and his wife
discussed ways to end Darlena's suffering "if the pain became unbearable." Id. This
did not occur. Id. LIke many assisted suicide supporters, Riley distinguishes between
the dying process-with which assisted suicide concerns itself-and the living pro-
cess. This arg'ument embodies the very logic that yielded the Roe trimester frame-
work and the Casey viability standard. Much like abortion, the question boils down
to what constitutes life and at what point do actions no longer affect a "living"
being?
142. AIDS Care Los Angeles is the state's largest AIDS resource and support organi-
Ors obtained the requisite number of signatures to place Proposition 161
on the California ballot, the opposition rallied in a last-minute advertising
campaign to defeat the initiative fifty-four percent to forty-six percent.
Ironically, this was the exact margin of defeat in Washington State one
year earlier.'M
Much like Washington's Initiative 119, Proposition 161 was criticized
for its inadequate safeguards. Essentially, Proposition 161 required the
following:
1. The patient must be certified as terminal (meaning a diagnosis of less
than six months to live) by two physicians."
2. The patient must be determined mentally competent, thereby exclud-
ing from consideration any patients who are comatose or in a permanent
vegatative state.14
3. The patient must execute a revocable, written statement witnessed by
two disinterested witnesses. This directive can be made any time prior to
the request for assistance.
4. The patient must indicate an enduring desire for the "procedure."
Broadly interpreted, this requirement simply means that the patient must
make the request more than once. There is no requisite time period that
must pass between the two requests.
5. Any licensed physician may perform the procedure and no witnesses
need be present.1
7
The main argument against Proposition 161 was not based on moral
grounds, as expected, but rather that the language was poorly drafted
and provided inadequate safeguards.'" The Los Angeles Times warned
zation. Failure to obtain their support may have been crucial, especially because
Proposition 161 was aimed at excruciating diseases like AIDS. B.D. Colen, Campaign
'92; California Is Voting On the Right to Die, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992, at 23. Another
critical opponent was the California branch of the American Cancer Society. Id.
143. Id. The Catholic Church raised almost $1 million in an attempt to defeat
Proposition 161. Id. The majority of these funds came from the Sunday collection
plates of California area Catholic churches.
144. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
145. This requirement would exclude the majority of patients that Jack Kevorkian
has assisted. Patients suffering from painful and excruciating illnesses or disabilities,
such as those incurred in auto accidents, or non-terminal conditions, such as
Alzheimer's disease, would not have been eligible under Proposition 161.
146. The two most renowned "right to die" cases involved unconscious patients. See
i fra notes 232-42 and 309-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the land-
mark cases In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), and Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990), respectively.
147. For the complete text of Proposition 161, see California Official Voter's Pam-
phlet for the November 1992 election.
148. James Walters, Perspective on Prop. 161, LA. TimEs, Oct. 18, 1993, at M5. For
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against "the fact that the oral request for euthanasia need not be wit-
nessed-just one among several missing safeguards-[thereby raising]
the serious possibility of abuse."'49 Proposition 161 was further criti-
cized because it failed to provide restrictions as to what type of physi-
cian would be eligible to perform the assisted suicide. Under the plain
language of the Proposition 161, an allergist, a pediatriciari, an oph-
thalmologist, or a dermatologist would have been able to perform the
procedure."w The absence of any psychological testing requirement also
caused concern. While the certifying doctor would have been obligated
to recommend such an evaluation, it was not required.'"' Lastly, the pa-
tient would not have had to endure a stated waiting period once the
decision had been made. Drawing a comparision between assisted sui-
cide and abortion, last term in Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Su-
preme Court announced that requiring a waiting period for abortion does
not present an "undue burden." " Thus, imposing a waiting period for
assisted suicides may be deemed a constitutional exercise of a state's
power."
Proposition 161 failed in the jurisdiction deemed most receptive to its
success. California has always been seen as an innovative and pioneering
state in most areas of the law. Even in this controversial "right to die"
area, it was California, not New Jersey (where the seminal In re Quinlan
case arose), that became the first jurisdiction to pass legislation enabling
citizens to refuse life-sustaining treatment. ' But now, voters have spo-
ken and Californians have refused to extend the "right to die" any fur-
ther. In 1994, the issue will be raised again in at least two other states:
Oregon and Washington."
instance, Walters cautioned against the absence of any "cooling off" period, which
might lead to "hasty, rash decisions." Id.
149. Twelve Statewide Ballot Measures Made Clear, LA. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1992, at B7
(emphasis added).
150. 'Dying with Dignity Act' is Flawed Bioethicist Says, Bus. Wire, Oct. 26, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file [hereinafter Dying with Dignity Act].
151. 1l
152. See supra note 16 for an introduction to Casey and infra notes 356-69 and
accompanying text for a more detailed analysis.
153. Dying with Dignity Act, supra note 150.
154. E.g., Lori Oiszewski, State's Controversial Choice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 20, 1992, at
Al.
155. Hemlock Society U.S.A Issues Statement on California's 'Death With Dignity
Act,' NEWSWiRE!, Nov. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file. The
Hemlock Society predicts that similar referendum proposals will be forthcoming on
account of the national attention the issue has received. Id.
The fight is far from over, and as yet no firm answer or alternative has
been offered. No country or state currently permits assisted suicide."
However, at least two states besides California are proposing legislation
aimed at assisted suicides.5 ' Other states have added the right to refuse
medical treatment and, consequently, included an implied right to die in
their state constitutions. '"
156. See supra notes 68-70, 99, 105-09 and accompanying text (describing the
Netherlands' practice condoning assisted suicide without legalizing the procedure).
157. Price, supra note 126, at A3. California voters defeated Proposition 161 in
1992. Id. Oregon plans to place a similar measure on its 1994 ballot Id. Florida in-
tends on proposing assisted suicide legislation at an undetermined time in the future.
Id.
158. E.g., Michigan Proposal Would Allow Suicide Assistance, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 12,
1991, at 3; see also Rick Pluta, Lawmaker Proposes Right-to-Die Referendum, UPI,
Dec. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file. Representative Ted Wallace
(D-Detroit) has proposed a right to die referendum which would legalize assisted
suicide. Id. Wallace's proposal is similar to Washington's Initiative 119, but has addi-
tional safeguards. The Wallace bill places the following conditions on legal assisted
suicide: (1) the physician would have to diagnose the patient as terminal; (2) the
patient would have to sign a written request for suicide; (3) a psychiatrist or psychol-
ogist must diagnose the patient as mentally competent; (4) the patient must endure a
two-month waiting period, and then repeat the request procedure; (5) two physicians
and a review board must review the request; and (6) the physician assisting the
suicide must have treated the patient for at least six months. Id. Even under these
guidelines, Dr. Jack Kevorkian's current practices would not be permitted. Interest-
ingly, a competing bill that would criminalize assisted suicide has successfully cleared
the Senate, but has not made it past the House Judiciary Committee. Id. See also
Antisuicide Bill Among Recent Filings, UPI, Jan. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, UPI file. Senator Jean A. Leising of Indiana (R-Decatur) introduced antisuicide
legislation which would criminalize intentional assisted suicide. If approved, the bill
would carry a maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment and a fine of up to
$10,000. Id. Senator Leising introduced the bill largely in response to Dr. Jack
Kevorkian and his activity in Michigan. Dr. Kevorkian has evaded prosecution due to
the unsettled nature of Michigan law and Indiana wants to avoid any similar dilem-
ma. Id.
For an example of possible state constitutional protection, see, e.g., AREz. CONST.
art. 11, § 8, which reads: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law." The Arizona Supreme Court interpreted this
section to encompass "an individual's right to refuse medical treatment." Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987). The Supreme Court stated, "[An
individual's right to chart his or her own plan of medical treatment deserves as
much, if not more, constitutionally protected privacy than does an individual's home
or automobile." Id. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court similarly
stressed the sacred nature of the human body in the context of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court upheld the defendant's con-
viction for driving while intoxicated, but recognized an individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interest in protecting his person from unwanted invasions. Id. at 772. The Court
held that removal of blood from defendant's arm in a hospital constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 759. The search was constitutional due to exi-
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D. '0 For 2'"-A Brief Synthesis
A thoughtful consideration of the two legislative defeats in California
and Washington gives rise to the question of whether legislation is the
answer at all. Perhaps these defeats should raise a deeper question: are
dignity, personal autonomy, and self-determination the real issues? The
solution might be much simpler, and more palatable, if the focus is
placed on the inability of many Americans to receive ample medical care.
The 1992 election illustrated the importance of this issue as the Demo-
crats took control of the White House based, at least partially, on the
inadequacies of medical care and the thrust for a national health care
system. Too few people receive quality medical care when that care be-
comes necessary. As one physician recently commented, "We have spent
too much money and effort on the technological aspect of medicine and
not enough on comfort care. The economic incentives have encouraged
us to build fancy intensive-care units rather than to develop the hospice
system."IN
One author emphasized the "bad timing" for both Initiative 119 and
Proposition 161.'" Unfortunately, medical insurance is currently consid-
ered a luxury for many people in this country. Such delicate decisions as
those surrounding assisted suicide should not be made under the finan-
cial pressure of a debilitating illness. While California's Proposition 161
provided that "no patient may be pressured to make a decision to seek
aid in dying because that patient is a financial, emotional or other burden
gent circumstances because a person's blood alcohol level decreases as time passes.
ld. at 770-71. Thus, the Court determined that the officers were justified in requiring
defendant to allow a physician to take a blood sample in a hospital. But see Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (requiring defendant to undergo a stomach-
pumping procedure violated "shock the conscience" standard and thus constituted an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment).
Other states with constitutional provisions safeguarding the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment are California, Florida, New Jersey, and Washington. Rasmussen, 741
P.2d at 682 n.10; Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983).
159. Lori Olszewsld, State's Controversial Choice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 20, 1992, at Al,
(quoting from Dr. Leslie Blackhel, a Los Angeles physician specializing in the re-
search of futile medical treatment).
160. Michael J. Meyer, Bad Timing for a Difficult Decision, THE RECORDER, Oct.
29, 1992, at 6.
to his or her family, other persons, or the state," this statement does not
protect against the subtle psychological pressures inflicted on individual
patients.6' Psychological coercion, particularly when an illness is drain-
ing family finances, might play an improper role in the decision-making
process. This problem cannot be solved merely by anti-coercive language
in proposed legislation. The health care dilemma in this country is a very
real and unfortunate problem." Legislators, however, need to be sensi-
tive to these considerations in devising effective legislation. The problem
will not go away with the passage of an assisted suicide law." The
problem requires a cure, not merely an alternate form of treatment.
IV. THE MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Dr. Jack Kevorkian-One Doctor's Impact
"Death is a punishment to some, to some a gift, and to many a favor. "'"
Labeled everything from "Dr. Death""s to "serial mercy killer,"'"
"saint,"6 T and "hero,"I Jack Kevorkian has thrust himself into the cen-
ter of the assisted suicide debate. It all began in June 1990, when
Kevorkian first euthanized a Michigan woman suffering from Alzheimer's
disease." Shortly thereafter, an Oakland County Circuit Judge perma-
nently enjoined the doctor from using his "suicide machine" again.'7" No
formal charges were levied against the doctor, however, due largely to
the uncertainty surrounding the law on assisted suicide in Michigan.
On October 23, 1991, Dr. Kevorkian defied the injunction and assisted
two more patients in committing suicide."n These three cases are identi-
161. Id. Mr. Meyer warned against what he terms "situational compulsion." He fur-
ther stated that "[njo one person need ever be guilty of direct, individual coercion
for people to feel the necessity to 'die and get out of the way.'" Id,
162. Coverage for All in Jeopardy Say Health Care Insiders, Bus. WIRE, Feb. 5,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file.
163. Jasper N. Keith, Jr., & M. Julian Du Hera, Jr., EUTHANASIA: We don't need to
resort to the taking of human life, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Nov. 15, 1992, at B2.
164. Lace, supra note 32 (quoting Seneca).
165. Diane Culbertson, Killing Mustn't Be Part of the Healing Art, USA TODAY, Oct.
28, 1991, at 12A.
166. "Suicide Doctor" Reveals Why He Performs Physician Assisted Suicides, PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 31, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, PR Newswire file.
167. David Von Drehle, Suicide Initiative Defeated, Not Dead; Euthanasia Seen As
Gaining Acceptance in U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, at A25.
168. Id.
169. See Price supra, note 4, at A4.
1170. Death Machine Barred By Circuit Judge, MICH. LAw. WKLY., Feb. 11, 1991, at
3.
171. Michigan has since passed legislation outlawing Kevorldan's activities. See infra
note 174 and accompanying text.
172. Patricia Edmonds & Carol J. Castaneda, Debate Over Right-to-Die Rekindled,
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cal in two respects: (1) Dr. Kevorkian was not the treating physician of
any of these patients, and (2) none of the three patients was terminal."
Furthermore, Dr. Kevorkian has not as yet received any legal censure for
his actions."m On February 6, 1992, however, Dr. Kevorkian was charged
with murder for his involvement in the deaths of these two "patients." "
The Michigan coroner who performed autopsies on these two patients la-
beled both as homicides and not suicides.' The medical examiner
ruled out suicide because "suicide is reserved for self-inflicted death, and
in this situation, all the evidence indicates these deaths were brought
about by another person."'"
Partly in reaction to the legal passivity, and partly in response to ques-
tions about whether the medical profession condones such activity, Dr.
Kevorkian's license was suspended by the Michigan Board of Medi-
cine." This provides a basis for the prosecution in any future assisted
USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 1991, at IA.
173. Harrison, supra note 2, at A15. Janet Adkins suffered from Alzheimer's disease;
Marjorie Wantz suffered from papilloma virus, a painful, chronic pelvic disorder, and
Sherry Miller had multiple sclerosis. Id. The women were not in the latter stages of
their respective diseases, but all were either in great pain or were becoming in-
creasingly dependent on others for their care. Id.
174. The situation may soon change. Kevorkian Home Probed Man May Have Wa-
vered in Suicide, LA. TmEs, Feb. 26, 1993, at A18. Michigan authorities began a
homicide investigation after receiving evidence that a man who sought Kevorkian's
aid in committing suicide may have changed his mind at the last minute. Id. A right-
to-life advocate recovered a document from the garbage of a Kevorkian associate.
The document is allegedly the minutes from the suicide of 70-year-old Hugh Gale on
February 15, 1993. Id. No charges have been filed as of February 26, 1993. Id.
Kevorkian has assisted 15 suicides since 1990, seven of these have occurred since
Michigan Governor John Engler signed a ban to take effect on March 30, 1993. Id.
On February 25, 1993, Governor Engler signed a bill that placed a ban on all assisted
suicides, effective immediately. Id. See 1992 Mich. Legis. Serv. 270 (West) (creating
Michigan commission on death and dying to recommend legislation to prohibit assist-
ed suicide).
175. Suicide Device Inventor Charged With Murder, supra note 2, at A21.
176. Id. See Examiner Rules Homicide in Two Deaths, CH. The., Dec. 19, 1991, at
18C; 2 Doctor.Assisted Suicides Ruled Homicides, N.Y. TtmEs, Dec. 19, 1991, at A29;
Two Assisted Suicides Ruled Homicides, LA. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at A22; Grand
Jury to Weighs Murder Charges in Suicide-Device Case, LA. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at
A24 (Dr. Kevorkian's attorney, Geoffrey Fleger, accused the prosecutor of "waging a
vendetta against the doctor" because of "political pressures").
177. Examiner Rules Homicide in Two Deaths, supra note 176, at 18C.
178. Milestones, TIME, Dec. 2, 1991, at 87. Time Magazine printed the following ac-
count of the suspension of Dr. Kevorkian's license:
SUSPENDED. Jack Kevorklan, 63, the retired Michigan pathologist dubbed Dr.
suicides under the "practicing medicine without a license" prohibi-
tions." Currently, Kevorkian has escaped legal penalty."
Many support Dr. Kevorkian's efforts to secure death rights for suffer-
ing patients.8' His opponents, however, are many.' First, and proba-
Death because he has helped three women commit suicide; from practicing
medicine; by the State Board of Medicine; in Lansing, Mich. Kevorlan first
came to the attention of authorities last year when he helped an Alzheimer's
patient kill herself by hooking her up to a suicide machine he had invented.
After he was charged with murder, the case was dismissed because Michigan
has no law against assisted suicide. But Kevorkian was barred from helping
people commit suicide in Oakland County. In October he called police to an
Oakland County cabin in a recreation area north of Detroit where he had
helped two women die. The county prosecutor's office is investigating their
deaths.
Id. Currently, Dr. Kevorkian's license suspension is on appeal. Kevorkian Charged in 2
Deaths, CH. Tsm., Feb. 6, 1992, at M3.
179. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 333.16294 (West 1992) (providing that "an individual,
who practices or holds himself or herself out as practicing a health profession regu-
lated by this article, without a license . . . is guilty of a felony").
180. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing possible criminal liabili-
ty of Dr. Kevorkian for a recent assisted suicide). Oakland County Prosecutor, Rich-
ard Thompson, has been unable to find a suitable law under which Dr. Kevorkian's
actions might be deemed criminal. In response, Michigan Governor John Engler and
the State Legislature passed emergency legislation making assisted suicide a felony,
effective March 30, 1993. A Deep Breath, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 32. Dr.
Kevorkian could spend as long as four years in jail if convicted under the new law.
Interestingly, he could not himself be put to death because the death penalty has
been outlawed in Michigan for more than 140 years. There Goes Dr. Death Again,
TIME, Dec. 7, 1992, at 29. After the law was passed, Dr. Kevorkian assisted in seven
more suicides. Kevrkian Home Probed,. Man May Have Wavered in Suicide, supra
note 174, at A18. As a result, Michigan passed a law banning assisted suicide effec-
tive on its signing date, February 25, 1993. Id.
181. As of February 26, 1993, Dr. Kevorkian had assisted 15 people in committing
suicide either by lethal iNection or by carbon monoxide ingestion. The list appears
below-
1. Janet Adkins, 54, of Portland, Oregon. Mrs. Adkins suffered from the beginning
stages of Alzheimer's disease, a non-terminal condition.
2. Marjorie Wantz, 58, of Sodus, Michigan. Mrs. Wantz suffered from intractable pelvic
pain, a non-terminal condition.
3. Sherry Miller, 43, of Roseville, Michigan. Mrs. Miller suffered from multiple sclero-
sis, a non-terminal condition.
4. Susan Williams 52, of Clawson, Michigan. Mrs. Williams also suffered from multi-
ple sclerosis, a non-terminal condition.
5. Lois Hawes, 52, of Warren, Michigan. Mrs. Hawes was Kevorkian's first truly termi-
nal patient. She suffered from lung cancer.
6. Catherine Andreyev, 45, of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Ms. Andreyev had breast can-
cer.
Pamela Warrick, A Legacy of Suffering, LA. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at E8.
7. Marcella Lawrence, 67, of Mt. Clemens, Michigan. Mrs. Lawrence complained of
osteoporosis, emphysema, heart problems, ulcers, cirrhosis, and arthritis.
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bly not surprisingly, is the American Medical Association.u Next is a
group of individual physicians that supports the right to assisted suicide,
but does not agree with Dr. Kevorkian's methodology. For instance, Tim-
othy Quill, a physician in Rochester, New York who assisted a dying
cancer patient's suicide by prescribing a lethal dose of medications,'" is
in this second category." Lastly, and perhaps most notably, is the op-
8. Marguerite Tate, 70, of Auburn Hills, Michigan. Mrs. Tate suffered from Lou
Gehrig's disease.
Ann Rogers-Melnick, Suicide or Murder?, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1992, at 7.
9. Jack Elmer Miller, 53, of Huron Township, Michigan. Miller suffered from bone
cancer.
10. Stanley Ball, 82, of Leland, Michigan. Ball had pancreatic cancer.
11. Mary Biernat, 73, of Crown Point, Indiana. Biernat had breast cancer.
12. Elaine Goldbaum, 47, of Southfleld, Michigan. Goldbaum suffered from multiple
sclerosis.
13. Hugh Gale, 70, of Roseville, Michigan. Gale suffered from emphysema and conges-
tive heart disease.
14. Jonathon Grenz, 44, of Costa Mesa, California. Grenz had throat cancer.
15. Martha Ruwart, 41, of Cardiff, California. Ruwart had duodenal and ovarian can-
cer.
David Margolick, For 'Dr. Death' It's 15 & Waiting Amid the Furor, Kevorkian Feels
Need for Re,-ite, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 23, 1993, at 7A.
182. As one commentator recently remarked, "'It's almost become obligatory for
people who write or speak about [assisted suicide] to distance themselves from
Kevorkian." Nancy Gibbs, Mercy's Friend or Foe, TIME, Dec. 28, 1992, at 36 (quoting
Yale Kamisar, a University of Michigan Law Professor).
183. Knox, supra note 123, at 15. Former Surgeon General, Dr. C. Everett Koop,
was a forceful opponent in Washington's Initiative 119 campaign. Id. Dr. Koop made
repeated appearances on radio and television speaking out against legalizing assisted
suicide. ld. Similarly, the American Bar Association has openly opposed assisted
suicide. Gall Apperson, Suicide Doctor Case Will Hurt Euthanasia Legislation,
REUTERS, Feb. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file. Kevorkian advo-
cates an uneonditional right to die. Id, Many other supporters of assisted suicide
propose limiting the right to persons diagnosed with terminal conditions. Id,
184. Vorenberg, supra note 103, at A25; see also Nancy Gibbs, Dr. Death Strikes
Again, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 78. Timothy Quill confessed to providing one of his leu-
kemia patients with sufficient barbiturates to kill herself. Id. Dr. Quill's account ap-
peared in the March 1991 edition of the New England Journal of Medicine.
Vorenberg, supra note 103, at A25. The State Board of Medicine found Dr. Quill's
conduct appropriate under the circumstances and cleared Dr. Quill of any alleged miscon-
duct. Gibbs, supra note 182, at 78. Despite his experiences, Quill opposes Dr.
Kevoridan's methodology, claiming that "[Kevoridan] certainly doesn't stand for the
mainstream, (and his actions] will again muddy the water." Id.
185. Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide, LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE, Spring-Summer 1992 at 116. Dr. Quill suggested that he was merely
"testing" legal boundaries. Id. at 119. Such "testings" illustrate the impact of judicial
position of the Hemlock Society and its founder Derek Humphry.M
They also object to Kevorkian's activities because, although they feel the
motive is right, the procedure is fallible.' It is the means and not the
end that raises these dissenting views. Despite this opposition, Dr.
Kevorkian has vowed to maintain his "practice" in the face of any legal
barriers or ramifications. Kevorkian considers this his "medical duty.""
Whatever the response to Dr. Kevorkian's active role in the assisted
suicide debate, his activity has drawn national attention-enough, per-
haps, that a legislative or judicial answer will be forthcoming.
B. The Medical Profession-A Question of Association
To cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort always."
The assisted suicide debate possibly has its greatest impact within the
medical community itself." On October 16, 1991, the American Medical
Association (AMA) published a review of Final Exit"' in the Journal of
the American Medical Association (JAMA). Although the article clear-
and legislative inactivity. A major distinction between Dr. Quill's case and .Dr.
Kevorkian's practices is that Dr. Quill was familiar with and currently treating "Diane"
.(the pseudonym' given to Dr. Quill's patient). Id.
186. Breo, supra note 6, at 2895. Humphry declined to join Kevorkian and establish
a "suicide clinic." Id. Humphry's displeasure with Kevorkian is ironic because both
men advocate a patient's unqualified right to actively end his or her own life. The
difference between the two is that while Humphry has offered a instructional book
with "recipes" for death, Dr. Kevorkian has gone one step further and actually pro-
vided patients with the necessary combined ingredients. Humphry has emphasized
that euthanasia may not be the answer to certain diseases, such as Alzheimer's. See
HILTON, supra note 8, at 62-63.
187. California Doctor Assisted Suicide Movement is Dead Set Against Dr.
Kevorkian's Stance, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 16, 1991, at 48. Californians Against
Human Suffering (CAHS), the organization trying to establish legalized assisted suicide
in California, has also condemned Kevorkian's* activities. CAHS partially credited
Kevorldan with the defeat of Initiative 119, and urged the doctor to "cease and desist
from assisting more suicides." Id.
188. Gibbs, supra note 182, at 36. Kevorkian stated, "If my colleagues won't work
with me, I will work alone." Id. This maverick attitude may be the very stumbling
block that prevents assisted suicide legislation from being adopted. Without the sup-
port of others involved in the crusade for a right to have physicians legally assist in
suicides, Kevorkian may remain the sole specialist in a one-man field.
189. Lace, supra note 32, at 3075 nl1. This inscription, a 15th-century folk saying,
appears on Gutzon Borghum's statue of Dr. Edward Livingston Trudeau in Sarona
Lake, New York. Id.
190. Samuel F. Hunter, Active Euthanasia Violates Fundamental Principles, 262
JAMA 3074 (1989) (presenting an interesting account of a medical student's perspec-
tive toward the growing ethical dilemma posed by assisted suicide).
191. HUMPHRY, supra note 6.
192. Steven H. Miles, Books: Final Exit: The Practicalities of Se(f Deliverance and
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ly stated that the AMA opposes assisted suicide, the impact of Derek
Humphry's book demanded the attention of the medical profession's
most prestigious journal. m The review was critical, raising several con-
cerns about physician participation in assisted suicide." The author ad-
monished the book's delivery of misleading information to the "'me de-
cade"s inattention to good care for the chronically ill."95
The book review was but one of an ongoing series of JAMA articles
published in response to this debate.' The majority of articles mechani-
cally follow the AMA dictate against active physician participation. 7
The AMA believes that "[m]edicine is about taking care of sick peo-
ple... [and it] .. can accept nothing that threatens th[e doctor-patient]
relationship by trying to make [doctors] agents of any efforts that would
violate [their] duty 'to do no harm'-by asking [them] to... assist in
suicide.""
This position is consistent with that held by the American Nurses As-
sociation (ANA), which similarly rejects medical involvement in assisted
suicide.' The AMA and ANA are concerned that sanctioning assisted
suicide will cast doubt on the profession's integrity.' ° Some physicians
fear that "[a]dding death-on-demand to our armamentarium would sub-
vert society's faith in us, which is crucial for our healing role.""' The
California Nurses Association also empathizes with the plight of the ter-
minally ill, but remains firm in its opposition to assisted suicide:
It should be noted that our opposition to active voluntary euthanasia is not meant
to imply that there are never situations in which an individual patient might not
Assisted Suicide for the Dying, 266 JAMA 2150 (1991).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. E.g., I)ucharme, supra note 113, at 1197; Lace, supra note 32, at 3075.
197. See, e.g., ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 35, at 118. "If a physician is involved,
the difference in personal involvement is between providing a suicidal patient with a
prescription that would be lethal if taken by the patient in certain amounts, com-
pared with the physician personally administering a lethal injection to the patient at
the patient's request." Id.
198. John J. Ring, The Right Road for Medicine; Professionalism and the New
American Medical Association, 265 JAMA 1694, 1694 (1991).
199. AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, CODE FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETIVE STATE-
MENTS § 1.3 (1985).
200. See iifra note 230 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the medical
profession's integrity has been recognized as a compelling state interest to be bal-
anced against the patient's right to refuse treatment
201. Hunter, supra note 190, at 3074.
actually benefit, (for example by relief of uncontrolled pain or nausea or other
forms of suffering), by a hastened death .... Rather, we strongly believe that the
negative consequences for society as a whole, and for the nursing profession, are
too serious to condone nurses' participation. m
Some believe physicians should never discuss the issue of assisted
suicide with a patient because patients put great credence in their
doctor's suggestions.'m Though the doctor may be merely presenting an
alternative, it is possible that the patient will receive mixed signals, ei-
ther as to his or her prognosis or the physician's own feeling regarding
the patient's best interests. One commentator claims that "a besieged
psyche could be swayed by even cursory mention of euthanasia, espe-
ciaUy if the suggestion were to come from a physician."' The level of
trust shared between doctor and patient (or nurse and patient) makes
the patient vulnerable to a doctor's influence, however unintentional it
may be. '
While "[tihe relief of suffering is a primary goal" of the medical profes-
sion, assisted suicide falls outside the parameters of relief.' Assisted
suicide is distinct from attempts to relieve suffering. Occasionally, a
doctor's attempt to relieve suffering will result in hastened death. A typ-
ical example is where a doctor gives a patient repeated and increasing
doses of morphine to curb pain but which eventually causes death.'? In
this case, however, hastening death is not the physician's motive. The
wish to ease pain is acceptable. The desire to terminate life, even if it
arises out of empathy for the patient's suffering, is not acceptable, how-
ever, and constitutes assisted suicide.'
Prescription medication and/or the progression of certain diseases can
also impair a patient's judgment.' This argument is particularly persua-
sive in modern society. The degenerative nature of such diseases as AIDS
202. Position Statement on Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill, CAL. NURSEs
ASS'N, 1991, at 2.
203. E.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 263 JAMA
1197 (1990) (letter to the editor).
204. Hunter, supra note 190, at 3074 (emphasis added) (citing David Orenlicher,
Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844 (1989)).
205. Position Statement on Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill, supra note
202, at 5-6.
206. Id. at 5.
207. See Vorenberg, supra note 103, at A25.
208. HILTON, supra note 8, at 134-53. Probably the earliest and least known example
of physician-assisted suicide is Lord Dawson's lethal injection that killed King George
V. Id. Lord Dawson's act was revealed in 1988 when his biography was published. Id.
Dawson injected King George with three quarters of a gram of morphine and one
gram of cocaine because "a lingering death would compromise the king's dignity, and
it was time for him to die." Id. at 13.
209. Hunter, supra note 190, at 3074.
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and Alzheimer's disease culminates in the deterioration of cognitive func-
tions."' A patient's inability to make rational decisions undermines any
voluntary consent requirement.
Further, patients who feel they are a financial burden on their family
may let economic considerations cloud their judgment. "' As one writer
observed, Washington could have become "the first state with the ulti-
mate in medical cost saving: kill yourself."'The AMA and ANA do not
want to be put in the position of battling against economic forces. The
medical field is accustomed to maldng medical decisions, not analyzing
economics. Still, financial planning is an integral part of any health care
plan and merits serious consideration.
C. Economics-Making Sense Out of Dollars
At the rate medical costs are increasing, economics will certainly play
a significant role in determining whether to legalize assisted suicide."3
Legislators will find themselves weighing the costs of treatment against
the prospect of recovery. Economic proportionality will enable people to
place a dollar value on the "life" at issue."'
This is not a new concept. Lawyers recognize the importance of eco-
nomics in nearly every decision they make."5 Many cases are analyzed
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Lacitis, supra note 136, at Fl.
213. RUSSELL GALLOWAY, THE RICH AND THE POOR IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 179
(1982). The author suggests that the United States Supreme Court was and is a polit-
ical body that decides cases on the basis of socioeconomic values rather than value-
neutral legal rules. Id.
214. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
The court in Drabick stated:
Proportionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient, has at least
a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits out-
weigh the burdens attendant to the treatment. Thus, even if a proposed
course of treatment might be extremely painful or intrusive, it would still be
proportionate treatment if the prognosis was for complete cure or significant
improvement in the patient's condition. On the other hand, a treatment
course which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be con-
sidered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually
hopeless for any significant improvement in the condition.
Id. at 846 (citing Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. CIL App.
1983)).
215. Patrick W. Brennan, Economic Analysis of Law, 55 U. CIN. L REv. 1159, 1159
according to their economic potential."' Absent organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), persons with claims of little
economic value or little social importance often will be turned away.
Lawyers are introduced to this concept shortly after entering law school.
Learned Hand's now-legendary algebraic formula " advocates taking on-
ly those preventive measures that are economically justified." Howev-
er, as common sense and morality clearly demonstrate, this "wealth max-
imization"" analysis fails to consider the noneconomic value of human
life. The unfortunate truth is that in our legal system, economic efficien-
cy tends to be the outer boundary of legal responsibility.'t
Therefore, economics certainly will be a driving force in the movement
to legalize assisted suicide. Many economic arguments support legaliza-
tion. First, one must consider the medical profession's ability to artificial-
ly sustain "life," even past the point of the cessation of life functions. Ma-
chines and medicines can stimulate blood flow to the the heart, and fill
the lungs with oxygen."I Second, medical resources currently available
in this country are limited. Not every patient who needs treatment, such
(1987) (book review). "There have been few developments in legal scholarship over
'the past two or three decades to rival the notion that principles of economics can be
used to evaluate legal rules and proceedings, even when the subject has no commer-
cial context." Id.
216. Jerry L Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public
Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L REv. 123 (1989) (characterizing the Supreme Court's criteria for
due process as "the sort of cost-benefit calculus that Posner advanced").
217. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge
Learned Hand adopted a B < PL formula for liability. The three factors considered
are: (1) the probability (P) that harm will occur, (2). the gravity of the resulting loss
(L), if harm occurs; and (3) the burden (B) of protecting against such harm. Id. at
173. In cases where the cost of protecting against injury outweighs the expected
injury and its contemplated expense, the individual will not be required to take
precautionary safety measures. Id. In a sense, this calculation to determine liability is
analogous to the Drabick "proportionality" formula. See supra note 214.
218. See generally WILuAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 31 (1971) (explaining
the negligence standard as "balancing the risk, in light of the social interest
threatened, and the probability and extent of harm, against the value of the interest
which the actor is seeking to protect").
219. See ROBIN P. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEO-
RY AND PRACTICE 61-65 (1990) for a thorough discussion of Posner's "wealth maximi-
zation" theory. Wealth maximization is a mathematical formula, giving credence only
to programs that are economically justified and, as such, fails to consider
noneconomic values. Id.
220. Mashaw, supra note 216, at 123. "In all of these circumstances, economics pro-
vides substantive criteria for the application of law, describes its underlying rationale
or defines its parameters for the evaluation of the law's success or failure." Id.
221. ARTHUR WINTER, THE MOMENT OF DEATH 3 (1968) (illustrating the ability of ma-
chines to maintain life functions, even to the point of successfully stopping and re-
starting the heart during certain surgical procedures).
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as those awaiting transplants, will live to see their needs met.' Third,
under the current system, funds that might otherwise be used elsewhere
or distributed in the patient's estate are being used to sustain the life of
a patient with a terminal disease. Lastly, prolonged treatment of terminal
patients contributes to. the increase in national medical costs. As insur-
ance funds are depleted, they must be replaced, resulting in increased
insurance premiums and the ensuing unavailability of insurance to a
growing number of Americans. 3 In sheer monetary terms, assisted sui-
cide should be a legal alternative to patients caught under the financial
burden of terminal diseases. Under an economic analysis, the terminal or
non-terminal nature of a disease is only relevant to the extent it relates
to cost of treatment. Unquestionably, under Judge Posner's "wealth maxi-
mization" theory, assisted suicide is an economically sound principle.
Economically speaking, assisted suicide merits legal recognition and
acceptance.
222. John J. Donohue I & Ian Ayers, Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking About
the Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L REv. 791 (1987)'(book review). The authors illustrate the
impact of Posner's economic approach:
"Suppose that pituitary extract is ... very expensive. A poor family has a
child who will be a dwarf if he does not get some of the extract, but the
family cannot afford the price ... A rich family has a child who will grow
to normal height, but the extract will add a few inches more, and his par-
ents decide to but it for him. In the sense of value used in this book, the
pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor family, because
value is measured by willingness to pay."
Id. at 797 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-12 (3d ed. 1986)). See LEE, supra note 11, at 68. Mr. Lee
describes one instance in England where the Oxfordshire Health Authority stopped one
patient's kidney dialysis treatment upon concluding that "he did not have 'a sufficiently
high quality of life.'" L The Authority terminated Mr. Sage's treatment in order that
another patient might benefit from the procedure. Id. The author relies on such factors
as age and intelligence to determine which patients might receive the limited resources.
For instance, Lee suggests that such a system might efficiently decide against those
who, "because of their advanced age[,] were prone to other health problems[,J so that
society might [get aproportionate number of] hours of life from however many hours
of treatment were provided." Id.
223. Malloy, supra note 219, at 61-65. "[C]onservative theory tells us that individuals
that are down on their luck without a job, or poor as a result of no fault of their
own, are simply without a legally recognizable claim to any of society's resources."
Id. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983).
V. THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Looking for Guidance
No court decision has directly addressed the issue of physician-assist-
ed suicide.' The only doctor openly "assisting" patients, Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, has to date avoided a legal determination on the criminality
of assisted suicide.' Further, no patient has successfully petitioned the
courts for an assisted suicide enabling order.' Therefore, the legisla-
tures and courts will need to draw inferences from analogous decisions.
The cases that will provide the most guidance are primarily the "right to
refuse medical treatment" cases and the more current "right to die" cas-
es.
Traditional tort law requires informed consent for medical
treatment. 1 Doctors initiating treatment without informed consent, ex-
cept in emergencies, are guilty of battery. ' Following this rationale, pa-
tients have established a qualified "right" to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, even when foregoing such treatment results in death.'
Throughout these decisions, the state routinely proffers four interests to
balance against the individual's qualified right: (1) preservation of human
life; (2) prevention of suicide; (3) protection of innocent third parties,
and (4) protection of the medical profession's ethical integrity.' ° The
224. Although the issue of a constitutional 'right to die" has frequently been pre-
sented to the courts, no court has yet had to determine whether the Constitution and
its pneumbra of rights includes a right to assisted suicide.
225. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
226. The closest case on point is McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990)
(holding a quadriplegic patient's right to refuse medical treatment outweighed state
interests, and permitting withdrawal of his respirator and administration of a seda-
tive).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOmRs §§ 18-20 (1965). Comment to section 18
states: "A, a surgeon, while B is under anesthesia, makes an examination of her
person to which she has not given her consent. A is subject to liability to B." I §
18, cmt. d (emphasis added). See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that "when a doctor performs an operation to which the
patient has not -consented, there is a battery." Id. at 7.
228. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In an often-
quoted statement, Justice Cardozo declared, "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." Id. at
93.
229. HILTON, supra note 8, at 120. The author points out that "[i]nformed consent,
you see, is as much about consent as It is about informing." Id In a national survey,
5996 of doctors perceived the term "informed consent" to require merely informing the
patient. Only 2696 of the doctors responded that "informed consent" requires actually
obtaining permission from the patient for a chosen course of treatment Yet, this is
their legal duty. Id.
230. Contrast these interests with the two asserted in the abortion cases, (1) the
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second factor is, of course, most relevant to the current topic. On occa-
sion, the state's interest has predominated over the patient's desire.'
In re Quinlan was the seminal case for the right to refuse treat-
ment and the right to die. In re Quinlan and its progeny expanded the
individual privacy rights first enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut.'
Karen Ann Quinlan fell into an unresponsive coma early in 1975.' The
court held that Karen was incompetent because she was diagnosed to be
in a permanent vegetative state.'s Her father sought a court order nam-
ing himself as guardian so that he might discontinue the respiratory, care
artificially sustaining her existence.' Although a free exercise claim
protection of potential life and (2) protection of the mother's health. E.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
231. See generally United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D.C. Conn. 1965)
(dissolving temporary restraining order providing blood transfusions to Jehovah's Wit-
ness who refused consent to such treatments after his condition improved to the
point where transfusions were no longer necessary); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.
v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (NJ. 1971) (holding State's interest in preserving life
overrode mother's refusal to consent to lifesaving medical treatment for her uncon-
scious daughter, even where such refusal was made because of sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs).
232. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). In re Quinlan was the first case to address the dilemma facing patients and
their families where medical technology is artificially sustaining the patient's life. The
court duly noted that
[d]evelopments in medical technology have obfuscated the use of the tradi-
tional definition of death." Id. at 656. The court further explained, "From
ancient times down to the recent past it was clear that, when the respiration
and heart stopped, the brain would die in a few minutes; so the obvious
criterion of no heart beat as synonymous with death was sufficiently accu-
rate .... This is no longer valid when modem resuscitative and supportive
measures are used. These improved activities can now restore 'life' as judged
by the ancient standards of persistent respiration and continuing heart beat.
This can be the case even when there is not the remotest possibility of an
individual recovering consciousness.
Id. at 656 (emphasis added) (citing A Definition of Ireverible Coma, 205 JAMA 337,
339 (1968)).
233. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the state could not constitutionally
prohibit married couples from using or receiving counsel regarding contraceptives,
thereby establishing marital privacy protections). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTrTUONAL LAw § 15-10 (2d ed. 1988).
234. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806-07 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified,
355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
235. Id. at 810-13.
236. Id. at 813-14.
was raised,' the decision did not substantially address the issue. Rath-
er, the court determined that had Karen been competent, she would have
been undeniably permitted to exercise her right to discontinue this ex-
traordinary treatment.m The court analogized Karen's situation to that
of a competent terminal patient who could refuse medical treatment at
will.' Karen's incompetency posed the greatest difficulty. The court in
In re Quinlan held that an incompetent's parent could be granted guard-
ianship and thereafter be permitted to exercise substituted judgment for
the patient.'s Karen's privacy concerns, vicariously raised by her father,
were deemed sufficient to overcome any state interest in preserving
life." Many commentators were surprised by the decision, but perhaps
the biggest surprise of all was Karen's unexpected survival. Karen re-
mained alive for several years after her respirator was disconnected.'
In re Quinlan opened the doors to a long line of cases granting pa-
tients the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The United States
Supreme Court addressed the right to die question for the first time in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.' However, many cases de-
cided in the interim demonstrated tolerance of the emerging right and,
therefore, merit discussion.
McKay v. Bergstedt" addressed the issue of whether a court could
order removal of an adult quadriplegic's respirator. Kenneth Bergstedt
suffered catastrophic injuries in a childhood swimming accident."' At
the age of thirty-one, Mr. Bergstedt feared the loss. of his caretaking par-
ents and sought court permission to remove a life-sustaining respira-
tor.' The court stated the four traditionally accepted state interests:
"(1)... preserving the sanctity of all life... ; (2) . . . preventing suicide;
(3) ... protecting innocent third persons who may be adversely affected
by the death of the party seeking relief; and (4) ... preserving the integ-
rity of the medical profession. " " The Bergstedt court also added a fifth
237. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (NJ.) (briefly discussing the Free Exercise
claim), cert. denied sub nora. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
238. 1d. at 663. In analyzing the Griswold privacy interest, the court stated that
"[pjresumably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances." Id.
239. Id. at 671.
240. TRIBE, supra note 233, § 15-11. In re Quinlan established the substituted
judgment doctrine in "right to die" cases. Id.
241. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
242. HILTON, supra note 8, at 94.
243. 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
244. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
245. Id. at 621.
246. Id. The court explained that "the answer is to be found in the balancing of
interests between the person in extremis and the State." Id.
247. Id.
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factor. "Encouraging the charitable and humane care of those whose
lives may be artificially extended under conditions that have the prospect
of providing at least a modicum of quality living."'
Bergstedt rested on principles of individual liberty" rather than treat-
ing the issue under the Griswold' and Roe"l privacy decisions.'
Under this liberty analysis, the right to assisted suicide is not automati-
cally deemed a fundamental right; therefore, the state's interests' must
be balanced against the individual's liberty interest.'
The court in Bergstedt concluded that under these facts, this patient's
right to self-determination in withdrawing the respirator outweighed
the state's interest in preserving human life.' The court distinguished
the facts in Bergstedt from assisted suicide.' 7 It noted a "substantial
difference between the attitude of a person desiring non-interference
with the natural consequences of his or her condition and the individual
who desires to terminate his or her life by some deadly means either
self-inflicted or through the agency of another." ' The court limited its
holding to allowing a patient to terminate extraordinary medical treat-
ment and distinguished choosing a natural death from suicide, the af-
firmative desire to take one's own life.'
248. Id
249. I& at 621-22. The Court relied on Cruzan in determining Bergstedt's liberty
interest- "Under the common law, '[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded ... than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.'" Id, at 621 (emphasis added) (quoting Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)).
250. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 485, 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut
law forbidding use of contraceptives as intrusive upon the right of marital privacy).
251. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding Texas criminal abortion statute
prohibiting abortion at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother
an unconstitutional infringement upon a woman's right of privacy).
252. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 622 ('We do not perceive a privacy right . .. as a basis
for refusing or withdrawing medical treatment and support.").
253. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
254. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 622.
255. The court limited its holding to "situations involving adults who are: (1) com-
petent; (2) irreversibly sustained or subject to being sustained by artificial life support
systems or some form or heroic, radical medical treatment; and (3) enduring physical
and mental pain and suffering." Al. at 624.
256. Id,
257. Id. at 632.
258. Id. at 627.
259. Id. at 626.
The Bergstedt court established guidelines for implementing its deci-
sion to allow "competent adult patients to refuse or discontinue medical
treatment."' The safeguards include requiring two independent physi-
cians to certify, after examining the patient, that (1) the patient is com-
petent, aware of available alternatives, and informed of the likely conse-
quences of refusing treatment; (2) the patient's condition is irreversible
(though not necessarily terminal); (3) the patient's condition is not termi-
nal, the patient is informed of care options available, and the patient's
response to such information is documented."6 The court determined
that if these conditions are satisfied, the patient may forego treatment or
have existing life support terminated.' Mr. Bergstedt died prior to dis-
position of the case,' rendering the issue moot and, thus, ineligible for
Supreme Court review.'
B. California Cases
In Bouvia v. Superior Court,' a California case analogous to
Bergstedt, the court held that a competent, non-terminal patient had the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, even where such treatment
was necessary to sustain the patient's life.'s Elizabeth Bouvia suffered
from severe cerebral palsy.' Her condition required nasogastric feed-
ing, which Ms. Bouvia resisted.' She desired removal of the feeding
tube and petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus overturning the
lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction.s The court issued the
writ, stating that Ms. Bouvia's "mental and emotional feelings" were as
"equally entitled to respect" as her "ability to tolerate physical discom-
260. Id. at 630.
261. Id.
262. Id The court in Bergstedt found that the patient's constitutional and common
law rights of self-determination prevail over the State's interests if these requirements
are met. Id,
263. Id. at 629.
264. See generaly TRIBE, supra note 233, at §§ 3-7--3-14. Under Article IH of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may only review "a case or controversy," i.e., an
existing dispute. Id, Where the party dies prior to review, the case becomes moot
and review will be denied. Id. at 3-12.
265. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
266. A significant distinction between Bouvia and Bergstedt is that in the former
case, the patient essentially asked the court to allow her to starve to death. See id,
While Mr. Bergstedt was dependant on a respirator, Ms. Bouvia breathed on her own.
Id,
267. Id. at 299.
268. Id. at 305. Bouvia's condition initially required she be spoonfed. Bouvia's
doctor ordered her attached to a nasogastric feeding tube after she announced her
intention to starve herself to death. Id. at 300.
269. Id at 298.
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fort."27
The Bouvia decision rested on two previous California cases, Barber
v. Superior Court" and Bartling v. Superior Court, which also ad-
dressed the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. All three
California cases focused on whether a competent, non-terminal patient
has a protected right to refuse life sustaining treatment. The unanimous
opinion was a forceful yes.
In Bartling, a seventy-year-old, ventilator-dependent, non-terminal
patient sought an injunction against the hospital and its doctors to force
them to disconnect his life-sustaining breathing machine.27 Mr.
Bartling's condition resulted from a lung biopsy puncture wound. ' The
wound caused the lung to collapse, rendering him dependent on a respi-
rator. 2 Mr. Bartling felt the respirator invaded his right to privacy and
requested its immediate removal.'m Mr. Bartling offered a living will,'
a durable power of attorney,' and a declaration stating that his living
conditions were "intolerable," because he was "continuously suffering
agonizing discomfort, pain and the humiliating indignity of having to have
[his] every bodily need and function tended by others."'
The Bartling court relied on In re Quinlan'm in holding that Mr.
Bartling had a right, under both case law and the California constitu-
tion," to refuse life-prolonging treatment, even where such refusal has-
tens death.' The court suggested, however, that the right to refuse treat-
270. Id. at 299.
271. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (issuing writ of prohibition for two
doctors charged with murder for disconnecting comatose patient from life support at
the family's request).
272. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that competent adult
patient has right to disconnect respirator, even though condition was not terminal).
273. Id. at 221.
274. Id.
275. Id
276. Id. at 224-25.
277. Living wills are valid under California law. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§
7185-7186 & 7188 (West 1991) (providing for living wills).
278. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2443 (West 1991) (authorizing durable powers of
attorney).
279. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
280. See supra notes 232-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re
Quinlan.
281. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
282. BartUing, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
ment is not absolute.' The court stated that this right must be bal-
anced against the state's interests in "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the
prevention of suicide; and (3) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. " '
Bartling is an important reference for future decisions because it neat-
ly catalogs much of the existing authority in the right to refuse medical
treatment and the right to die line of cases. One of the most insightful
distinctions the court in Bartling made was the difference between the
state's interest in preventing suicide and a patient's right to refuse treat-
ment that necessarily results in imminent death. The court held the latter
was acceptable because
such an act does not necessarily constitute suicide since "(I) in refusing treatment
the patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even if he did, to the
extent that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient did not set the
death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own death ....
Furthermore, the underlying state interest in this area lies in the prevention of
irrational self-destruction. What we consider here is a competent, rational decision
to refuse treatment when death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of
cure or preservation of life. There is no connection between the conduct here in
issue and any State concern to prevent suicide."'
Barber v. Superior Court' examined the criminal liability of physi-
cians who carry out non-treatment orders."' The family of a comatose
man requested that he be taken off all life-sustaining machinery.' The
doctors followed the family's request and were subsequently convicted of
murder and conspiracy to commit murder.' The Barber court reversed
the convictions, resting primarily on the rationale presented in
Bartling and Bouvia." Prior to falling into a coma, the patient told
his wife what his wishes were if he were to face this very situation.'
He did not want his life to be artificially sustained.' The court deter-
283. 1d. at 225.
284. Id. In a footnote, the court mentioned that a fourth interest, the protection of
innocent third parties, was not implicated under these particular facts. Id. at 225 n.6.
The court cited Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), as the leading case dis-
cussing this additional interest. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.6.
285. Id. at 226 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426 n.l (Mass. 1977)) (emphasis added).
286. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
287. Id. at 486.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 486-87.
290. Id. at 489-90. See supra notes 273-84 and accompanying text.
291. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90. See supra notes 265-72 and accompanying
text.
292. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
293. Id. at 492. The court stated 'the patient's interests and desires are the key
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mined the physicians had conformed with existing law in terminating the
unwanted treatment.'s In fact, had the physicians refused to disconnect
the life-systems, they could have been prosecuted for battery.'
Although no California case has directly confronted the assisted sui-
cide issue, the most recent case to address the right to die issue was
decided immediately prior to the United States Supreme Court's disposi-
tion of Cruzan.' Conservatorship of Drabick7 addressed a petition
very similar to the one at issue in Cruzan. The main distinction between
the two cases was that in Drabick, the court permitted a significantly
lower evidentiary standard to be used in deciding whether the
conservatee's nasogastric feeding tube could be disconnected, while the
Cruzan court upheld a Missouri law requiring "clear and convincing
evidence."' Mr. Drabick sustained severe head injuries in a automobile
accident." He degenerated into a permanent vegetative state, with no
prospect of recovery.'s Mr. Drabick's brother was appointed conserva-
tor and applied for an order authorizing removal of the nasogastric
tube."' Evidence as to Drabick's desires expressed before the accident
were offered, and no one opposed the petition.' The superior court
ingredients of the decision making process." Id.
294. Id. at 491-92.
295. Id. at 489.
296. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
297. 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988).
298. Id. at 849-51. Under the California Probate Code, the conservator of an incom-
petent person has the authority to discontinue life-sustaining procedures if the patient
is diagnosed as permanently comatose and the conservator considers discontinuance
to be in the conservatee's best interest. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 2355 (West 1991). The
standard that a conservator must meet under section 2355 is that a decided course
of treatment is in the conservatee's "best interest," which can be shown through a
patient's previous expressions. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50. Further, the conser-
vator need not follow the conservatee's expressed preference, but only need consider
such expression in good faith. Thus, a conservator lacking knowledge of any prefer-
ence may discontinue life-sustaining treatment if the conservator determines such
course of action is in the conservatee's best interest. Id.
In Dimbick, the only evidence adduced regarding known preferences were state-
ments Drabick made to a Ms. Gonzales, who lived with Drabick 12 years prior to the
accident, indicating that he would not want to be kept alive artificially. Id. at 842-
843. Drabick's four brothers all agreed that the conservetee would not want to con-
tinue in such a bleak condition. Id. at 843.
299. Id. at 842.
300. Id.
301. Id, at 842-43.
302. Id. at 843.
denied Drabick's petition, however, finding that it was in Mr. Drabick's
"best interest" to continue nasogastric feeding.' The court of appeal
overturned the decision primarily based on section 2355 of the California
Probate Code, which gives a conservator wide latitude in exercising a
conservatee's available rights.' The Drabick court, citing both Barber
and In re Quinlan, advocated imputing the right to discontinue life-sus-
taining treatment of a comatose patient to the family members or, as in
the instant case, to the conservator.'
The Drabick decision will be valuable to future courts that address
right to die issues. Additionally, much of the language will be helpful in
future attempts to assert a right to assisted suicide because the court
accepted "quality of life" as a valid argument.' The testimony of Mr.
Drabick's family is analogous to the arguments of non-comatose patients
suffering from degenerative diseases.' The court found these argu-
ments persuasive in determining the conservetee's best interests.m
Drabick, however, was rendered prior to Cruzan and, therefore, must be
considered in light of the Supreme Court's decision.
303. Id. Because Drabick showed signs of brain wave activity, the court felt that
continued feeding was in the patient's best interest Id. at 842-43.
304. Id at 849-50.
305. CAL PROB. CODE § 2355 (West 1991) (this imputed right is available in Califor-
nia irrespective of judicial approval). The only Instance that requires judicial approval
is where the conservator is an interested party or where there is disagreement be-
tween the parties. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
306. A key passage was that "[u~nder California law . . . human beings are not the
passive subjects of medical technology." Id. at 854. The court noted that
to delegate an incompetent person's right to choose inevitably runs the risk
that the surrogate's choices will not be the same as the incompetent's hypo-
thetical, subjective choices. Allowing someone to choose, however, is more
respectful of an incompetent person than simply declaring that such a person
has no rights.
Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
307. Many of the phrases offered are identical to the arguments made in support of
assisted suicide. The speaker is making a value judgment on the quality of the inca-
pacitated individual's life. Drabick's brothers echoed many of the comments of Dr.
Kevorkan's patients. For example, one brother stated that Drabick "would not view
his present state as a meaningful or as acceptable existence" and "would not want to
continue living in his present condition." Id. at 843. Janet Adkins, Marjorie Wantz,
and Sherry Miller used these same words to describe their respective conditions. The
distinction is that Drabick's conservator petitioned for the removal of life-sustaining
nutrition, while Kevorldan's patients sought an affirmative solution to their illnesses.
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. Courts and legislatures must decide
whether there is any significant difference between the two acts in a legal sense.
308. See inra notes 332-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the qualified
right to abortion. Although theoretically a woman has the right to seek an abortion,
after a certain period of time the state's interest in preserving life with prevail over
the mother's privacy rights.
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C. Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health"s
Cruzan established that "a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."31
The United States Supreme Court also held that when a person is incom-
petent, the State may constitutionally impose a heightened evidentiary
standard before allowing termination of artificial life support.'" The
Court in Cruzan faced the difficult question of whether to accept and ex-
tend In me Quinlan's "substituted judgment" doctrine."' While In re
Quinlan involved the withdrawal of a respirator, Cruzan posed the more
difficult dilemma of removing food and water."3
The facts of the two cases are practically identical. Early in 1983, Nan-
cy Beth Cruzan sustained traumatic injuries in a car accident.,"' She suf-
fered severe anoxia,"' and consequently fell into a permanent vegeta-
tive state."6 Nancy's parents petitioned the court for an order permit-
ting removal of feeding and hydration."7 The lower court found both a
state and federal right to "refuse or direct the withdrawal of 'death pro-
longing procedures.'" 8 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, finding
the petitioners failed to meet the State's clear and convincing standard of
309. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
310. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
311. I& at 284.
312. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
313. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267.
314. Id. at 266.
315. Anoxla is defined as a lack of oxygen, as in suffocation. Id. at 266 n.1 (spe-
cifically detailing Nancy's medical condition as accepted by the lower courts). Nancy
"suffered anoxia of the brain resulting in a massive enlargement of the ventricles fill-
ing with cerebrospinal fluid in the area where the brain has degenerated and [her]
cerebral cortical atrophy is irreversible, permanent, progressive and ongoing." Id.
316. Id. at 266. "[Plersistent vegetative state" is defined as "a condition in which a
person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive
function." Id (footnote omitted). Further,
"[Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of
its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and
pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activi-
ty of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is
no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surround-
ings in a learned manner."
Id. at 266 n.l. (citation omitted).
317. Id, at 267.
318. Id, at 268.
proof."1 The evidence offered consisted of testimony by Nancy's friend
that Nancy had stated that she "would not wish to continue her life un-
less she could live at least halfway normally."'m The Missouri Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court's decision that a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment existed under the doctrine of informed con-
sent, but simply found the evidence presented deficient under the clear
and convincing standard."I
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed the
Missouri Supreme Court's decision.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, was willing to accept the right of a competent person to
refuse unwarranted medical treatment.' The Court, however, protected
Missouri's use of procedural safeguards when a surrogate exercises that
right for an incompetent person.' The Court considered the higher
standard appropriate where "[t]he choice between life and death is... of
obvious and overwhelming finality."' The Court explained that
[an erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status
quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical
science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in
the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration
of life-sustaining treatment, at least create the potential that a wrong decision will
eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to with-
draw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.' '
The Court analyzed Cruzan under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, declining to adopt a right to refuse treatment as a
right of privacy.' This distinction may become crucial in future cases.
It is certainly relevant in hypothesizing how the Court will analyze the
assisted suicide issue. Cruzan referred to Bowers v. Hardwick,' and
distinguished due process, or liberty interests, from claims under the
right of privacy.' Liberty interests seem to provide greater latitude in
319. ld. See generaily RALPH C. CHANDLER ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw DESKBOOI4
INDMDUAL RIGHrs 313 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (describing clear and convincing evidence
as "the highest standard of evidence used in a civil proceeding").
320. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
321. Id. at 267.
322. Id. at 270-78.
323. Id. This included the right to refuse hydration and nutrition. Id. The quandary
presented in Cruzan was whether surrogates have a legal right to stop undesired
feeding measures for incompetent individuals. The new Cruzan procedure, allowing
removal of nasogastric feeding for an incompetent individual, raises new ethical ques-
tions. The holding was limited, however, to protecting Missouri's heightened eviden-
tiary standard under such circumstances. Id. at 284.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 281.
326. Id. at 283.
327. Id. at 279 n.7. See CHANDLER ET AL, supra note 319, at 317.
328. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
329. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7. Constitutional law scholars believe footnote seven
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fashioning rights dependent on the Court's notion of their historical ac-
ceptability rather than on the individual's claim to entitlement under the
Constitution. The subtle distinction is that liberty claims focus on the
right being asserted, while privacy claims focus on the individual assert-
ing the right.' Bowers is an excellent illustration of this principle."
Thus, the assisted suicide issue, if analyzed according to Cruzan and
Bowers principles, will turn on whether the Court finds the right to com-
mit suicide historically persuasive. The treatment of suicide throughout
our history will, therefore, become instrumental in accepting, or more
likely, in denying a constitutional right to assisted suicide.'
offers much insight to the Court's decision. For a critical analysis of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's subtly placed dichotomy, see Dennis Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No".
A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA_ L REV.
283, 332-34 (1992). Two additional sources merit consideration due to their insightful
treatment of footnote seven. See Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 77 CORNELL L REV. 490, 546-47 (1992); Elizabeth D. McLean, Comment,
Living Will Statutes in Light of Cruzan v. Director Insuring that a Patient's Wishes
Will Prevail, 40 EMORY LJ. 1305, 1312-13 (1991).
Chief Justice Rehnquist draws the subtle distinction between liberty and privacy
in this footnote, setting the tone perhaps for cases that follow. The importance of
this footnote material cannot be understated, recognizing that the decision turned on
the constitutionality of an evidentiary standard rather than the merits of the "right to
die." When (and if) the Court squarely faces the "right to die," this material may
appear in the text of their decision.
330. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
331. Id. at 191-92. Bowers held that homosexual sodomy is not protected under the
Constitution. Id. at 190-91. The court applied a historical approach and based much
of its findings on the common-law and early colonial prohibitions against sodomy. Id.
at 192-94. "It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscrip-
tions against that conduct have ancient roots." Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). The applicability of Bowers to the assisted suicide controversy lies in the
Court's willingness to extend this analysis to assisted suicide. The Court may follow
the Bowers rationale: "Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was for-
bidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of
Rights." Id (footnote omitted). The same can be said of assisted suicide. In deter-
mining whether a liberty interest exists, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, con-
sidered whether the activity is so "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition'" that it warrants constitutional protection. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
332. Id. at 210 (Blaclkmun, J., dissenting). The Court was hesitant to "expand the
substantive reach of [the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments], particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental." Id. at 195. In contrast, the privacy line of cases authorizes protection
of interests which are deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or which
D. Roe v. Wade.
Many parallels can be drawn between assisted suicide and the right to
die and the abortion cases, particularly Roe v. Wade. In determining how
the courts and legislatures might handle the assisted suicide issue, Roe
offers a solid foundation upon which to build.'
The companion case to Roe, Doe v. Bolton,' is equally significant.
Doe challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia anti-abortion statute."
The statute provided for several restrictive procedural requirements.'
Doe is illustrative of a seemingly protective legislative plan that fails con-
stitutional scrutiny.m The Court found that the anti-abortion statute, re-
quiring approval from two outside physicians other than the patient's
treating physician, and compelling advance approval from a hospital
abortion committee before the procedure could be performed, violated
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.m
Doe emphasized the private, trusting nature of a doctor-patient rela-
tionship.' 'The right to seek advice on one's health and the right to
have been accepted historically. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678,
697 (1977) (striking down New York statute that prohibited distribution of contracep-
tives to those under age 16 and to anyone except by a licensed pharmacist as an
unconstitutional burden on the decision of whether to bear children); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (declaring Texas statute prohibiting abortion' at any stage of
pregnancy except to save the life of the mother unconstitutional as an infringement
on a woman's right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding
that law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals violated
Equal Protection Clause and was contrary to individual's right of privacy); Loving v.
Virinia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (voiding Virginia law outlawing interracial marriages as
violating both the Equal Protection Clause and the fundamental right of marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that Connecticut law
forbidding use of contraceptives unconstitutionally infringed upon the right of marital
privacy).
333. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
334. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991) (upholding restriction prevent-
ing Title X agencies from providing abortion counseling). In Rust, the Court held that
receipt of federal funds can be made contingent upon compliance with such regula-
tions. Id. at 1771. This case may be important in those scenarios involving Medicaid
or federal insurance funds because Rust clearly stated the government can withhold
funds from one activity, to the exclusion of others, without discriminating. Id. at
1772.
335. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
336. Id. at 181.
337. Id. at 183-84. The statute provided that two independent physicians must con-
cur in the treating physician's recommendation of the abortion and the abortion must
be approved in advance by a hospital abortion committee. Id.
338. Id. at 189-91.
339. Id. at 201; see also id. at 218-19 (Douglas, J., concurring).
340. 1l at 198-200.
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place reliance on the physician of one's choice are basic to Fourteenth
Amendment values."" The Georgia statute failed in part because of its
overreaching protectional safeguards.' In essence, the statute forced a
doctor-patient relationship upon patients desiring abortions that was
devoid of the natural trust that accompanies choice and familiarity.'
Doe recognized that, under this statute, a non-treating physician or a
committee wholly unfamiliar with the patient, could veto the attending
physicians orders.5 " Thus, the statute permitted independent doctors
and committee-persons to make health decisions for the patient, even if
they contravened those that the patient and treating physician had made
previously.
Assisted suicide advocates seek to implement procedural safeguards
similar to those rejected in Doe.5" These safeguards "protect" patients
and physicians from freely making decisions regarding their course of
treatment. Outsiders receive the power to evaluate and override the pro-
priety of sensitive decisions.' However, as Doe demonstrated, such inter-
ference in the decision- making process violates due process."7 While in
theory such safeguards protect the individual from inadvertently acting
on poor decisions, the reality is that the process strips the individual,
acting on the advice of his or her personal physician, of the power to
decide upon the best course of treatment.
Still, supporters of Washington's Initiative 119 and California's Proposi-
tion 161 claim these constitutionally defective safeguards would have
satisfied voters desire for assurance that these decisions would not be
involuntarily implemented or hastily undertaken.' The Constitution, as
interpreted in Doe; forbids this "procedural" kind of interference in in-
tensely personal decisions. " ' Roe and Doe espouse a limited right of
abortion, free from state interference in the decision-making process.
Assisted suicide followers will need to consider the precedential value of
341. ld. at 219-20 (Douglas, J., concurring).
342. Id. at 189-91.
343. Id. at 198-200.
344. Id.
345. See supra notes 121-58 and accompanying text discussing Washington's failed
Initiative 119 and California's similarly defeated Proposition 161.
346. The Wallace Bill proposed in Michigan provided that two doctors and a review
board must review a request for assisted suicide. See supra note 158 and accompany-
ing text.
347. Doe, 410 U.S. at 198-200.
348. See Hemlock Society Statement, supra note 124 and accompanying text.
349. Doe, 410 U.S. at 198-200.
Doe when devising safeguards for assisted suicide legislation. The pas-
sage of a constitutionally infirm statute would be as much a failure as
Washington's Initiative 119 or California's Proposition 161, because such
a statute could never take legal effect.
Assisted suicide proponents also seek to protect individuals from over-
reaching physicians, such as Jack Kevorkian. ° The abortion controver-
sy raised these same concerns and motivated the Georgia legislature to
pass the restrictive safeguards struck down in Doe." In Doe, Justice
Douglas stressed the State's ability to pursue alternative disciplinary
avenues in cases of impropriety and overreaching.' This same ap-
proach is available in assisted suicide cases.
Both abortion and assisted suicide involve a final act that cannot be
rectified if improperly carried out. The only existing recourse is punish-
ment after the fact. Nevertheless, our Constitution grants a certain
amount of latitude for persons to err, choosing primarily to protect the
freedom of the individual from prior restraint.' Excessive government
entanglement with individual decisions is unacceptable, both as a soci-
etal command and under the Constitution.'
Recently, the Court had occasion to reconsider its position on privacy.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services' and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey" offered sufficient departures from Roe to enable the Court to
reevaluate some difficult political issues."? Both cases protected the
foundation of Roe but suggested the Court is willing to permit further in-
trusion into a woman's right to obtain an abortion. After Casey, only
those limitations that pose an "undue burden" will be struck down as
unconstitutional.' Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, stated
that a regulation will be deemed an "undue burden" only when "a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
350. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
351. Doe, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing prior restraint in a
First Amendment context).
352. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
353. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (reasoning that the State's interest
in preserving life does not' justify broad prohibition on abortion in early stages of
pregnancy); see also TRIBE, supra note 233, at §§ 12-34--12-36.
354. Doe, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J., concurring).
355. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
356. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
357. See Hewitt, supra note 15, at 1009-10.
358. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. Although the Court retained the essential holding of
Roe, the plurality adopted Justice O'Connor's 'undue burden" test, which was first
announced in Webster. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). The Casey plurality found that "no change in Roe's
factual underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an argu-
ment for overruling it." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
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the path of a woman seeking an abortion."' State legislatures hoping
to write laws passing both popular and constitutional muster apparently
have several resources to study. First, Washington's failed Initiative 119
must be considered. An examination of this proposal's failure yields im-
portant information regarding society's skepticism in legalizing assisted
suicide." Secondly, California Proposition 161 must be examined."
The California proposition came after Washington's Initiative 119 but still
did not sufficiently convince voters that assisted suicide is a safe or de-
sired alternative.' Both proposed laws contained numerous loopholes
and insufficient safeguards to garner the required support.' The com-
bined failure of these measures signals a need for assisted suicide Sup-
porters to tighten their proposed requirements and include numerous
safeguards.' The right, though available, should not be easy to ob-
tain.' Due to the finality of the act, some outside evaluation should be
required to protect unwilling or hesistant patients.' Yet, as Doe illus-
trates, a non-treating physician should not be given veto power without
the patient retaining some method of judicial review. 7 One method
known to be constitutional would be a procedure similar to a minor's
right to a judicial determination that she is sufficiently mature to obtain
an abortion.' Likewise, a wise inclusion in assisted suicide legislation
would be to provide some method for a court to determine patient com-
petency in a psychological sense." Lastly, cases addressing analogous
"rights" should be thoughtfully considered prior to proposing new laws
on assisted suicide. Roe and Cruzan are starting points, but other deci-
359. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor stated that such
a statute 'cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate end."
Id. Thus, any statute imposing an "undue burden" on a woman seeking an abortion
fails the requisite strict scrutiny test and is therefore unconstitutional. Id.
360. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
362. A 54% to 46% defeat was posted in both state elections. See Knox, supra note
123.
363. See, eg., Walters, supra note 148.
364. See supra notes 159-03 and accompanying text for a discussion synthesizing
the two failed efforts.
365. Walters, supra note 148.
366. Id.
367. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
368. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
369. One of the main criticisms of California's Proposition 161 was that while a
doctor could recommend a psychological evaluation, he or she was not required to
do so. Dying uith Dignity Act, supra note 150.
sions will certainly affect the initial determination of whether assisted
suicide is a cognizable right either under a privacy analysis or as a pro-
tected liberty interest based on the common law right to refuse unwant-
ed treatment. Until such laws exist, however, it is imperative that attor-
neys familiarize themselves with presently existing alternatives. To this
end, such alternatives are briefly explained below.
VI. PRESENTLY EXISTING LEGAL ALTERNATIVES
A. Substituted Judgment
The doctrine of substituted judgment first appeared in an English prop-
erty case.' The doctrine permitted the niece and other relatives of a
lunatic to share property from the lunatic's estate." Substituted judg-
ment enables a conservator or guardian to make a decision for an incom-
petent person based upon what the conservator feels the incompetent
would have decided for him or herself.m In re Quinlan incorporated
the doctrine into the right to refuse treatment and right to die cases.'
The substituted judgment doctrine was later employed in Belchertoum
State School v. Saikewizc0" and remains a viable option for a conserva-
tor of an incompetent patient in seeking to assert the right to refuse
medical treatment.
B Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney
A living will is a document that prohibits unwanted medical treatment
370. Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
371. l at 880.
372. EDWARD D. ROBERrTSON, JR., PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT 5
(1991). Judge Robertson is the author of Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988), the case that preceded the Supreme Court's disposition in Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
373. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976). See also BOWEN HOSFORD, MAKING YOUR MEDICAL
DECISIONS 122 (1982). Hosford illustrates what substituted judgment, a true legal
fiction, would mean if literally acted out-
[Imagine 4Karen standing] before her father as once she had, five-feet, two-
inches tall, clear-eyed, so that she could tell him her decision. Joseph
[Karen's father] would place his one good arm about her shoulders and say
*Look, honey, let's say that on the night of April 15 last year, you went at
least a half-hour without breathing. You now lie pinned at the throat by the
connection from a respirator. You are deformed and shrunken and have none
of the ability to reason or communicate that makes humans human. A respi-
rator keeps you breathing Should it be disconnected?
374. 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-32 (Mass. 1977) (applying the doctrine to an adult mental
incompetent suffering from Incurable leukemia).
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for patients who, because of an accident or surgical complications, sud-
denly become incompetent.' Living wills state the individual's intent if
he or she should become incompetent and dependent upon extraordinary
medical treatment'e The California Natural Death Statute, the first of
its kind, was enacted in 1977. The statute legalized the use of living wills
in securing medical treatment directives.' The Model Bill, drafted at
Yale Law School in 1978, set forth many of the same requirements in
model form, including an example of the declaration format and an op-
tional designation clause.' At least thirty-six states currently recognize
living wills as enforceable advance care directives.'
Durable Powers of Attorney (DPAs) are similar to substituted judg-
ment in that they enable another person to make decisions for an incom-
petent individual. DPAs are a product of agency law, requiring the indi-
vidual designating the power to be competent at the time he or she exe-
cutes the power.' The term "durable" refers to the directive's lasting
nature, remaining in effect until specifically terminated by the individual
establishing the power." The distinction between a living will and a
DPA is that the former explicitly states the individual's intentions, while
the latter requires an agent of the individual to determine what the
375. HOSFORD, supra note 373, at 141.
376. Id.
377. CAL HI.ALTH & SAFET CODE § 7185 (West Supp. 1992). In pertinent part, the
Act reads as follows:
(a) The Legislature finds that an adult person has the fundamental right to
control the decision relating to the rendering of his or her own medical care,
including the decision to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn
in instances of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition.
(b) The Legislature further finds that modem medical technology has made
possible the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural limits ....
(d) In recognition of the dignity and privacy that a person has a right to
expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of Califor-
nia shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written declaration
instructing his or her physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment in the event of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condi-
tion, in the event that the person is unable to make those decisions for him-
self or herself.
Id.
378. HANDBOOK OF LIVING Wnis LAws 35-38 (Society for the Right to Die ed., 1984).
379. 22A AM. JuR. 2D Death § 684 (1988). See 22A AM. JuR. 2D Death §§ 683-707;
Thomas H. Schimke, The Natural Death Act. Protection For The Right To Die, 47
MONT. L REV. 379 (1986).
380. 3 AM. Ju.m 2D Agency § 28 (1988).
381. Id. § 36.
individual's intentions would have been. Thus, the main flaw in DPAs are
that someone other than the individual must make a binding decision on
behalf of the individual without actual knowledge of what the individual
would have done. A chilling example is found in the unreported New
York case of Carrie Coons.' Carrie fell into a deep coma after suffer-
ing a massive stroke.' As is quite typical in the right to die cases, rela-
tives petitioned the court for removal of her nasogastric feeding tube.
The petition was granted.' Before the tube was disconnected, Carrie
awoke from her coma.' Startled, her sisters and doctors attempted to
explain her situation, asking if she would like the tube removed. Carrie
responded that "[t]hese are difficult decisions."
VII. CONCLUSION
The In re Quinlan progeny offers valuable information regarding the
Court's probable direction. The prevailing attitude favors individual au-
tonomy in regards to medical decisions. Thus, the Court seems willing to
expand the definition of what constitutes medical treatment in order to
protect the rights of the individual. In re Quinlan advanced the notion
that mechanical breathing devices constitute "treatment." Thus, the indi-
vidual, or the individual's guardian, may remove a respirator as an exer-
cise of their right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. It is doubtful
the In re Quinlan court considered the lasting and changing effect their
decision would have on individual rights. This initial departure from pre-
serving "life" has served as a catalyst for cases like Bergstedt, Bouvia,
Barber, and finally Cruzan: the most current pronouncement of what
procedures amount to treatment.
Little difference exists between wanting to starve oneself to death
because of a condition caused by an accident or disease and the affirma-
tive desire to inject life-ending chemicals into the bloodstream because
of this same condition. The distinction is between a negative act that is
protected and an affirmative act that is not currently protected. The right
to die will either become absolute, making people truly autonomous, or
the right will be qualified, much as the right to an abortion under Roe. In
this sense, Roe is both the beginning and ending point of reference.
Cruzan, though instructive, is limited to its facts and, as a result, its
precedential value is limited. Cruzan will be instrumental in the assisted
suicide debate only if the courts label assisted suicide a liberty interest,
382. ROBERTSON, supra note 372, at 1.
383. Id,
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Shortly thereafter, Carrie again fell into a coma. Id
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rather than a privacy interest. Liberty interests are only protected when
the right existed historically or is so rooted in the concept of ordered
liberty that it merits modem protection. Assisted suicide is unlikely to
succeed under a liberty interest analysis. Suicide was a felony at com-
mon law and aiding and abetting suicide remains criminal in at least
twenty-seven states. Thus, similar to the Court's analysis of homosexual
sodomy in Bowers,' there is no historical basis to support protection
of suicide as a liberty interest. However, with the analogies ahsisted sui-
cide can draw from abortion, the issue more likely will be reviewed as a
privacy interest.
Roe followed the identical historical and legal analysis present in the
assisted suicide controversy. Under Roe's legal framework, assisted sui-
cide should receive no less legal protection than abortion. If there is a
departure from Roe' and the judicial system strips women of their
right to an abortion, the future of assisted suicide as a right of privacy
will be clouded.
Medical advancement has blurred both the definition of life and cer-
tainty of when life ends. The fear of a long and painful death process will
probably continue to yield more assisted suicide legislation. Currently,
Natural Death Acts and living wills are an accepted part of modem soci-
ety and offer viable alternatives to suffering patients. The right to refuse
medical treatment is similarly permitted. The next logical step is to allow
dying or diseased patients the right to use the same medical technology
that prolongs their agony to relieve them of their suffering. Whether one
supports an individual's "right" to die or opposes such free choice, as-
sisted suicide is a topic certain to incite passion in all.
MARY MARGARET PENROSE
387. See surfa notes 330-31 and accompanying text; see also Though It Be Asked
Of Me, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at F2.
If suicide is a right, then it is one that has remained undiscovered through-
out the ages by the great thinkers in law, ethics, philosophy and theology. It
appears nowhere in the Bible or Koran or the Talmud. Committing suicide
wasn't a right . . . 1000 years ago, and it isn't one now..
IL
388. The controversy remains unresolved despite the Court's disposition of Casey v.
Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). With the possibility of a shift in the
Court in the near future, this question remains "viable."

